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Comment
MARYLAND'S RIGHT OF IN BANC REVIEW
The judiciary system was further discussed to the hour of adjourn-
ment, without any important action upon its provisions.'
INTRODUCTION
Maryland is perhaps the only state in the country that gives liti-
gants a constitutional right to have their cases reviewed by a panel
of trial judges.2 Most Marylanders appear unmoved by that fact,
however, because comparatively few invoke their right to an in banc
review.3 Whatever else might cause their neglect, it is not the pedi-
gree of the in banc rule: it comes from no less an authority than the
Maryland Constitution of 1867, and it stands virtually unchanged in
today's constitution as article IV, section 22.
The conventional wisdom-what there is of it on this mostly
ignored provision-suggests that in 1867 the constitutional dele-
gates provided in banc review as a "poor person's appeal": a simpli-
fied appeal for those who could not afford to travel to Annapolis or
produce appellate briefs.4 Most authorities seem to assume that the
1. AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER (Baltimore), July 23, 1867, at 1 (com-
menting on the news of the constitutional convention on the day Richard H. Alvey intro-
duced a provision guaranteeing Marylanders a right to in banc review).
2. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22; MD. R. 2-551. Compare PA. R. Civ. P. 227.2 (al-
lowing Pennsylvania trial judges discretion to have post-trial motions decided by a court
en banc of up to three judges); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 112 (1988) (three-judge trials).
3. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text. In Maryland we spell it in banc-
not en banc, in bank, or even in banco. We are not the only state to spell it this way, see, e.g.,
Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (in banc), although the
Maryland spelling is much rarer than en banc. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MOD-
ERN LEGAL USAGE 213 (1987). Some Maryland authorities are unable to appreciate the
local peculiarity. See Smith v. County Executive, 47 Md. App. 65, 69 n.4, 421 A.2d 979,
980 n.4 (1980) (per curiam) (saying the various forms are used interchangeably and then
using en banc, notwithstanding the Maryland Constitution). Judge Paul Niemeyer and
Linda Richards, in their definitive commentary on the Maryland Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, confronted the problem head on: "There is no justification for the spelling in banc
other than the fact that it was used by the drafters of the Maryland Constitution." PAUL
V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. RICHARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 339 (1984).
4. See Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 396, 404 A.2d 1027, 1029 (1979);
MARYLAND RULES COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE RULES COMMITTEE 65
(Mar. 12-13, 1982) [hereinafter MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE RULES COMMITTEE]
(comments of Judge McAuliffe); 4 GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE FORMS § 1271, at 154 (1984); NIEMEYER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 338.
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rule is an anachronism, 5 created as it was many years before the in-
vention of the automobile, the word processor, and the Court of
Special Appeals. Surely today no litigant is worried about the ex-
pense or delay of driving to Annapolis. But the authority for the
rule is the state constitution, so it cannot be ignored entirely.
Hence use of the rule should be restricted where possible and in no
case expanded beyond its constitutional boundaries.6
This Comment is an historical and legal study of the right to in
banc review in Maryland. Part I contains a general description of
the in banc provision as it operates in Maryland. Part II re-examines
the original purpose of the rule. Although there is some support for
the poor person's appeal theory, a close look at the Constitutional
Convention of 1867 suggests that the framers intended in banc re-
view to be much more: it probably was a central component of the
new, "three-judge" judiciary formulated at the convention, and it
may have been an important compromise provision that made the
proposed three-judge system more palatable to an opposing contin-
gent of delegates who supported a "one-judge" system.
Part III describes current in banc practice as it has been imple-
mented by the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure and summarizes
the modern constitutional issues concerning article IV, section 22,
such as whether the in banc rule violates equal protection and
whether the Court of Appeals may constitutionally alter the provi-
sions of section 22 through its rulemaking powers. Part III recon-
siders the value of the right to in banc review in light of the
historical findings from Part II. This section also discusses whether
in banc review has a place in the modern Maryland judiciary, or
whether it is a useless anachronism that lawyers should continue to
ignore and that the Court of Appeals should continue to circum-
scribe. Finally, Part III suggests several ways the Court of Appeals
could change in banc practice to make it both more valuable to
Maryland litigants and more faithful to the original intent of section
22.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE IN BANC RULE
The Court of Appeals set out the details of in banc practice in
rule 2-551 of the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure.7 Although the
5. See NIEMEYER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 339 ("The original and historical func-
tion for including the in banc provision in the Constitution has long passed.").
6. See MD. R. 2-551(a); HARRY M. SACHS,JR., POE'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 19, at
25 (1970).
7. In banc review is also available in criminal proceedings. For the most part when I
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reason for the constitutional in banc provision may not be clear, it is
evident that the reason for the procedural in banc provision is the
constitutional provision. The Rule begins, "When review by a court
in banc is permitted by the Maryland Constitution,"' and then lays
out the applicable procedure for taking an in banc review. Plainly
the Court of Appeals included the provision to restrict the right to
its constitutional dimensions.9
When the constitution permits in banc review,"0 rule 2-551 pro-
vides that parties "may have a judgment or determination of any
point or question reviewed by a court in banc."' t The standard pro-
cedure to preserve objections for appeal also suffices to reserve is-
sues for in banc review.12 An aggrieved party has ten days after
refer to rule 2-551, I mean both that Rule and its criminal counterpart, rule 4-352, which
specifically incorporates rule 2-551:
In banc review of a circuit court's judgment or determination is governed
by the provisions of Rule 2-551, except that the right of review does not apply
to criminal actions exempted under the Maryland Constitution. In applying
Rule 2-551, references to Rules 2-517, 2-520, and 2-533 shall be construed as
references to Rules 4-323, 4-325, and 4-331(a) respectively.
MD. R. 4-352; see also Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493, 489 A.2d 22 (1985) (relying on civil
cases to decide a point of law arising from a criminal in banc review).
8. MD. R. 2-55.1 (a). The Maryland Constitution provides:
Where any Term is held, or trial conducted by less than the whole number
of said Circuit Judges, upon the decision or determination of any point, or
question, by the Court, it shall be competent to the party, against whom the
ruling or decision is made, upon motion, to have the point, or question re-
served for the consideration of the three Judges of the Circuit, who shall consti-
tute a court in banc for such purpose; and the motion for such reservation shall
be entered of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made;
and the several Circuit Courts shall regulate, by rules, the mode and manner of
presenting such points, or questions to the Court in banc, and the decision of
the said Court in banc shall be the effective decision in the premises, and con-
clusive, as against the party, at whose motion said points, or questions were
reserved; but such decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal, or
writ of error to the adverse party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which
appeal, or writ of error to the Court of Appeals may be allowed by Law. The
right of having questions reserved shall not, however, apply to trials of Appeals
from judgments of the District Court, nor to criminal cases below the grade of
felony, except when the punishment is confinement in the Penitentiary; and this
Section shall be subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law.
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
9. See also MD. R. 2-551(g) ("The panel ... shall dismiss an in banc review if (1) in
banc review is not permitted by the Maryland Constitution .
10. See supra note 8.
11. MD. R. 2-551 (a).
12. Id.; see also MD. R. 2-517 (contemporaneous objection rule). The provision al-
lowing normal objections for in banc practice appears to contradict earlier interpreta-
tions of section 22, and this became the subject of a major appellate debate. See
Montgomery County v. McNeece, 311 Md. 194, 533 A.2d 671 (1987), in which the pro-
vision was upheld, albeit in dicta. See infra Subpart III.E.
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judgment or ten days after disposition of certain post-judgment mo-
tions to file for in banc review."' The in banc panel consists of three
trial judges. Thejudge who heard the case at trial may not serve as
a panel judge, however. 4
In banc reviews are relatively informal. The party seeking re-
view files a "memorandum" rather than a brief, and responding par-
ties need file a memorandum only if they dispute the statement of
questions or facts; memoranda of argument are optional for re-
sponding parties.15 Transcripts are not always required; rather, one
of the panel judges decides whether a transcript is "reasonably re-
quired for decision of the questions presented."' 6 A "hearing," as
opposed to an argument, is automatically scheduled, but may be
waived by consent of all parties.' 7 Best of all, an in banc panel
"shall file a brief statement of the reasons for the decision or shall
dictate the reasons into the record."'" Thus, in banc panels have no
reason to delay justice in order to draft a publishable opinion.
In banc reviews under rule 2-551 are designed to proceed rela-
tively quickly, in part because of amendments made to the Rule in
1986. A motion for in banc review is due ten days after entry of
judgment,' 9 the movant's memorandum is due thirty days later,2 °
and the optional reply memorandum fifteen days after that. 2' Hear-
ings are scheduled "as soon as practicable," and the decision, which
theoretically could come at the hearing, should take considerably
less time than a normal appeal because of the absence of a written
opinion .22
13. MD. R. 2-551(b).
14. MD. R. 2-551(a).
15. MD. R. 2-551(c); see also MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE RULES COMMITTEE,
supra note 4, at 65-66 (suggesting that there was a conscious decision in committee to
differentiate in banc reviews from ordinary appeals by requiring memoranda rather than
briefs).
16. MD. R. 2-551(d); see also MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE RULES COMMITrEE,
supra note 4, at 68 ("In explanation of section (d) Judge McAuliffe noted that one mem-
ber of the panel will be designated chairman and the chairman will then designate the
judge who will decide, in accordance with section (d), whether a transcript is required.
Conferring with counsel, when deemed necessary, can be accomplished by telephone.").
17. MD. R. 2-551(e).
18. Id.
19. MD. R. 2-551(b). Note that if there is a pending post-judgment motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, or to alter or amend a judgment,
the time for filing for in banc review is extended to ten days after disposition of the
motion. See id.
20. MD. R. 2-551(c).
21. Id.
22. See MD. R. 2-551(e).
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The most important provision of the in banc rule for lawyers to
understand states that "[a]ny party who seeks and obtains review
under this Rule has no further right of appeal. ' 23 The responding
party, on the other hand, may appeal to the Court of Special Ap-
peals.24 Thus, filing for in banc review essentially waives the filer's
right to the normal appellate process, at least with regard to the
specific issues reserved for the in banc panel. Because the respond-
ing party is free to pursue further appeals, it is not immediately ap-
parent why any modern lawyer would file for in banc review. This
question will be considered in Part III.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF IN BANC REVIEW
A. The Poor Person's Appeal
The only modern attempt to understand why the Maryland
Constitution provides for in banc review appears in Judge Digges's
opinion for the Court of Appeals in Washabaugh v. Washabaugh :25
Although the reason for section 22's inclusion in the con-
stitution is not altogether clear, it appears to have been, as
its commonly recognized nickname of "the poor person's
appeal" suggests, a response to a fear of the framers of the
Constitution of that year that the distance to Annapolis and
the concomitant delay and expense incident to prosecuting
an appeal in the Court of Appeals would discourage or pre-
clude many litigants from seeking justice by means of ap-
pellate review.
2 6
Later authorities cite Washabaugh for the poor person's appeal ra-
tionale, if they cite anything.27 But Judge Digges himself suggested
that the origin of the in banc rule was unclear, and the Washabaugh
opinion is thin on historical authority. After noting that delegate
Richard Alvey introduced section 22 at the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1867, Judge Digges cited only one authority for the poor
person's appeal rationale: a page from a Court of Appeals opinion
written by Alvey himself two years after the convention. 28 In the
23. MD. R. 2-551(h).
24. See MD. R. 8-202(d) (extending appeal deadline to Court of Special Appeals to 30
days following withdrawal or disposition of in banc review petition).
25. 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979).
26. Id. at 396, 404 A.2d at 1029.
27. See Smith v. County Executive, 47 Md. App. 65, 71 & n.6, 421 A.2d 979, 981 &
n.6 (1980); 4 LIEBMANN, supra note 4, § 1271, at 154; NIEMEYER & RICHARDS, supra note
3, at 339.
28. See Washabaugh, 285 Md. at 396, 404 A.2d at 1029 (citing Roth v. House of Ref-
uge, 31 Md. 329, 333 (1869)).
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single relevant sentence from that opinion, Alvey was really explain-
ing how the Baltimore City court system worked. He discussed in
banc review only by analogy:
[T]he relation of the Supreme Bench to the other Courts of
the city is that of a Court in banc, where parties can have
questions of law deliberately considered by at least three
judges, without the delay and expense of an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, and where they can have the benefit of
such review in many important cases where an appeal will
not lie.29
Richard H. Alvey, the protagonist in the development of in
banc review, was forty-one years old when the Convention of 1867
assembled. He had already earned a name for himself by authoring
a resolution in Washington County that expressed some support for
President Lincoln's federal government but repudiated war as a
means to protect that government.30 That resolution earned him a
place in federal prison for several months during the Civil War.3'
Alvey was first elected to the bench in the fall following the
adoption of the Constitution of 1867. He served as a judge for the
next thirty-eight years, first as an associate on the Maryland Court of
Appeals, later as ChiefJudge, and finally as the first Chief Justice of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.32 During President
Cleveland's tenure, there were several reports that Alvey would be
named to the Supreme Court of the United States, but for unknown
reasons he never was. 3
During his time on the bench, Alvey reportedly wrote over 3000
opinions. 34 He probably would be surprised to know that the only
substantive explanation ever offered by the Court of Appeals as to
the purpose of the constitutional right to in banc review came from
his opinion describing the Baltimore City court system35-a court
29. House of Refuge, 31 Md. at 333.
30. See Alexander Armstrong, Reminiscences ofJudge Richard Henry Alvey, 52 MD. HIST.
MAG. 124, 137 (1957). This article, which is really an editing of a speech given by an
Alvey contemporary in 1934, probably contains the best biographical information on
Alvey. The original is in the manuscript collection at the Maryland Historical Society.
For other biographical information, see 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 234
(1927); 2 THOMAS J.C. WILLIAMS, A HISTORY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY', MARYLAND 618-
22 (1906).
31. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 128.
32. Id. at 129-30.
33. Id. at 131.
34. 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 234, 235 (1927).
35. Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869).
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system which he and the other delegates probably never intended to
be covered by section 22 anyway.
The fact remains, however, that only two years after adoption of
the constitution, the man who introduced the in banc provision
thought that it might reduce the "delay and expense of an appeal to
the Court of Appeals.""6 That certainly is some evidence sug-
gesting that in fact the framers intended section 22 to operate as a
poor person's appeal. Moreover, research from contemporaneous
records of the Constitutional Convention of 1867 yields additional
evidence that the delay and expense of appeals were on the dele-
gates' minds, and that some of them thought that section 22 might
help alleviate those problems.3 7 On the other hand, contemporane-
ous records also suggest that the expense and delay of appeals were
not the only reasons that Alvey introduced section 22, and they may
not have been the principal ones.3 8
B. The Judiciary and the Constitutions of Maryland
Maryland citizens wrote three new constitutions between 1851
and 1867. The Constitution of 1867, which survives today and
which created the in banc rule, in many ways returned the judiciary
to the system that existed before the Constitution of 1851. Thus, to
understand the judiciary issues at the Convention of 1867, one must
look at the structure of Maryland's judiciary in the first half of the
nineteenth century.
An 1805 amendment to the Constitution of 1776 divided Mary-
land into six judicial districts, each of which contained three
judges."9 Judges were appointed by the governor and held their of-
fices during good behavior. One judge in each district was the chief
judge, and the six chief judges together constituted the Court of
Appeals.4" The three district judges sitting together comprised the
county courts in the counties within their districts. 4' At the time, it
was not unusual to have three judges preside at many trials, includ-
ing jury trials.42
Little has been written about the operation of Maryland's three-
36. Id. at 333.
37. See infra Subpart II.C.
38. See id.
39. ELBERT M. BYRD, JR., THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN MARYLAND 9 (1961).
40. The judge who heard the case below was not allowed to sit in the appellate pro-
ceedings, so ordinarily the bench consisted of five judges. See Act ofJan. 12, 1803, ch.
55, § 5, 1804 Md. Laws.
41. BYRD, supra note 39, at 9.
42. Cf. G. KENNETH REIBLICH, A STUDY OFJUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE STATE OF
440 [VOL. 51:434
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judge trial courts during this period. One sarcastic, turn-of-the-cen-
tury practitioner thought the two associate judges were superfluous,
comparing them to "alabaster busts on each side of a clock over a
chimney piece. The middle machine, it is true, tells the time, but it
may tell it wrong. The silent figures . . .are yet insensible of its
errors." 43 At that time, only the chief judge was required to have
legal training, so it is easy to imagine the associates as alabaster
busts. An amendment to the constitution in 1805, however, re-
quired that all three judges have legal training.44
In any event, the Constitution of 1851 transformed Maryland's
judiciary. All judges were to be elected rather than appointed, and
their terms were limited to a number of years.45 The total number
of judges was decreased, apparently in response to persistent com-
plaints about the expense of the judicial process to the taxpayers.4 6
The new Court of Appeals consisted of one elected judge from each
of four districts, and its judges had only appellate authority. At the
trial level, one judge was to be elected for each of eight districts.
The single judge of the district would circulate to the individual
county courts.4 7 Baltimore City, on the other hand, became a dis-
tinct judicial entity, and various new courts were formed there.48
The Maryland Constitution of 1851, which condoned slavery,4 9
MARYLAND 54 (1929) (suggesting that, by the early part of this century, single-judge
trials were the rule except in "grave criminal cases").
43. CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 93 (1928) (quoting
Memoir of John Leeds Bozman, in the files of the Maryland Historical Society).
44. See Act ofJan. 12, 1803, ch. 55, § 1, 1804 Md. Laws (authorizing the appointment
of "three persons of integrity and sound legal knowledge" for each of the six judicial
districts). Vermont has a version of this system that has survived to this day. Each court
has one presiding judge and up to two "assistant judges," who are not lawyers and who
are popularly elected. These "side judges," as they are called, have voting power over
issues of fact, although the presiding judge decides all questions of law. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, § 112 (1988). Recent changes may have limited the influence of the side
judges. See Richard H. Coutant, Note, A Farewell to Side Judges; or, Are We Available?, 10
VT. L. REV. 321 (1985).
45. BYRD, supra note 39, at 10.
46. Id.
47. REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 47-48 (1967). There
seems to have been little debate at the Convention of 1851 about changing from a three-
judge to a one-judge system. There was a fair amount of discussion about the value of
requiring judges to ride circuit within their districts, as opposed to allowing one judge to
sit per county. See, e.g., 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CON-
VENTION TO REVISE THE STATE CONSTITUTION 564-65 (1851). Interestingly, there was
considerable debate on whether the Orphans' Courts should have one or three judges.
See, e.g., 2 id. at 593-94.
48. See BYRD, supra note 39, at 11-13.
49. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 43 ("The legislature shall not pass any law abol-
ishing the relation of master or slave, as it now exists in this State.").
19921 441
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could not survive the pressures of the Civil War. Although the war
deeply divided Maryland residents, the federal government ensured
that Maryland remained officially neutral. Federal troops inter-
vened in important ways at the state-wide elections in 1863, which
was probably the cause of the election of a disproportionate number
of pro-Union legislators. 50 When these "Unconditional Unionists"
took office they immediately called for a new state constitutional
convention. 51 At the subsequent election of convention delegates in
1864, the federal military was not quite so conspicuous; neverthe-
less, it is likely that a disproportionate number of Unionists became
delegates to that year's constitutional convention.5 2 The Demo-
crats, who would be the dominant party in the next convention,
brought a states' rights platform to the convention, but they consti-
tuted only thirty-five of the ninety-six delegates and thus were un-
able to implement their ideas.5
3
The battles that led to the Convention of 1864 were not fought
over judiciary issues,54 and the changes to the judiciary in the new
constitution were not radical. The one-judge system was retained,
although the number of districts (now "circuits") was increased
from eight to thirteen.5 5 The judges were again required to sit (in-
dividually) in each county within their respective circuits, thereby
forming the circuit court for that county.56 Perhaps what was most
important about the Convention of 1864 was that after the war,
many Marylanders felt that the constitution it begat had been forced
upon them by federal troops, which created a ground swell for yet
another constitutional convention. It is interesting, however, that
the delegates in 1867 decided to return not to principles of the pre-
Civil War judiciary, but to those preceding the Constitution of
1851-particularly to the principles (if not the practice) of the three-
judge judiciary.
The moving political forces behind the calling of the Conven-
tion of 1867 were the Democrats and the Conservatives, who allied
to conduct a vigorous campaign for a new convention based largely
on the idea that their opponents, the "radicals," were a minority
group who had imposed their own liberal agenda on the state dur-
50. WILLIAM S. MYERS, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION OF 1864, at 10 (1901).
51. Id. at 15, 31.
52. Id. at 34-35.
53. Id. at 35-36, 39.
54. For a complete discussion of the Constitution of 1864, see generally id.
55. BYRD, supra note 39, at 14.
56. Id.
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ing the war.57 The Democrats, having attained a majority of the leg-
islative seats after the war, also sent a majority of the delegates to
the convention. 58 The Democratic agenda was generally conserva-
tive, although the convention produced its share of liberal reform.5 9
Nevertheless, the Democrats arrived in Annapolis intending gener-
ally to return the state to an earlier system of government, in the
judicial branch as well as in the others.
C. The Constitutional Convention of 1867
The delegates to the 1867 Convention decided in their wisdom
not to keep a record of their debates.6 ° They were concerned not
with confidentiality or with promoting free exchange of radical
ideas, as was the case at the federal constitutional convention, 61 but
with something much less ethereal: money. The members decided
that $2.50 per day was too much for the State of Maryland to spend
on a professional reporter.62 Additionally, some of the members
believed that the newspaper reporting of the early days of the con-
vention had been so superior that an official reporter would add lit-
tle.63 Consequently, the principal contemporaneous authority cited
today, Perlman's The Constitution of 1867, is nothing more than a col-
lection of newspaper reports of the convention printed by The Sun.
This is unfortunate because newspapers at the time could be quite
partisan in their views of the convention,' and because, as The Sun
57. See DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 29-32
(Phillip B. Perlman ed. 1923) [hereinafter Perlman].
58. Id. at 6 (reprinting a letter from Frank A. Richardson to the Editor of The Sun,
May 12, 1923).
59. See REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 61 (1967) (citing a
provision declaring that persons are not incompetent to testify on account of color).
60. Perlman, supra note 57, at 83-84. The delegates did keep a journal of the "pro-
ceedings," which consists mostly of the delegates' votes on individual provisions and
official reports of the convention. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, OF MARY-
LAND, TO FRAME A NEW CONSTITUTION (1867) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE
CONVENTION].
61. See CATHERINE D. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 22-23 (1966).
62. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 74. The Baltimore American rather acidly observed:
The Democratic Convention at Annapolis yesterday distinguished itself by
resolving, by a vote of sixty nine [sic] to thirty-five-almost two to one-to dis-
pense with the services of an official reporter of the debates. The discussions of
this remarkable body will therefore be lost to future generations-unless its
action be reconsidered. We would not be astonished if the next proposition
adopted would be that their sessions be secret ....
AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER (Baltimore), May 18, 1867, at 1.
63. See Letter from Frank A. Richardson to Editor of The Sun (May 12, 1923), replrnted
in Perlman, supra note 57, at 6.
64. See, e.g., BALTIMORE COUNTY UNION (Towsontown, Md.), Aug. 3, 1867, at 2 ("We
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itself now seems to admit," its man at the convention was not the
most thorough reporter who attended.66 The result is that search-
ing for original intent in the Maryland Constitution is uncertain and
often disappointing, particularly on a provision as unclear as section
22. Nevertheless, there are sources beyond Perlman that provide
some insight on the in banc rule.
1. Judiciary Issues at the Convention.-Reforming the judicial sys-
tem was one of the principal issues at the Constitutional Convention
of 1867. The convention delegates met from May 8 to August 18,
with a ten day recess in July.6 7 Various delegates brought up issues
concerning the judiciary early in the convention,68 but there was no
sustained debate on any of these issues until afterJune 26, when the
Judiciary Committee made its report.69 That report included a re-
turn in substance to the three-judge judiciary, 7° a necessary predi-
cate to the in banc rule. Unfortunately, not only were there no
official reports of committee deliberations, there were no unofficial
really believe now the democratic convention, in session at Annapolis to be the most
despicable body of copperheads ever assembled in council."); BALTIMORE COUNTY
UNION (Towsontown, Md.), June 29, 1867, at 2 ("The democratic convention now in
session at Annapolis, is still laboring hard to tinker up a Constitution which, while it will
be perfectly satisfactory to their party friends, may totally exclude all decent men from
holding office under it."); THE CECIL WHIG (Elkton, Md.),June 1, 1867, at 2 (describing
the group as the "Slavery Constitutional Convention"); AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL AD-
VERTISER (Baltimore), May 9, 1867, at 1 ("At Annapolis yesterday a Convention called in
defiance of the Constitution, and with the approval of less than one-third of the white
voters of Maryland, assembled to change the organic law of the State, and to further
deplete the treasury and increase taxation .... ).
By comparison, The Sun was a voice of reason during the convention, but it was
generally considered to be a pro-south and pro-Democrat paper during this period, see
HAROLD A. WILLIAMS, A HISTORY OF THE BALTIMORE SUN, 1837-1987, at 66-68 (1987),
and so it had much less to scream about than the newspapers cited above. Indeed, The
Sun's reporter at the convention, Francis Asbury Richardson (whose dispatches compose
the bulk of Perlman's seminal book), had been kicked out of Baltimore during the war
for his southern sympathies and was later jailed when he tried to sneak back into town.
Theo Lippman, Jr.,Journalism 101, THE SUN (Baltimore), Apr. 11, 1983, at A6.
65. See WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 68; Lippman, supra note 64, at A6.
66. The Baltimore Gazette and particularly the Baltimore American and Commercial Adver-
tiser often published more detailed accounts of a particular day's events at the conven-
tion. Microfilm of the former is available in the Maryland Historical Society; the latter is
available in the main branch of the Enoch Pratt Free Library.
67. Perlman, supra note 57, at 34, 45, 489-90.
68. See, e.g., id. at 68 (order to collect data from circuit courts); id. at 85 (Alvey asks
the judiciary committee to consider a two-judge system).
69. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 333-43. In fact,
most of the debating on judiciary issues occurred in the end ofJuly and the beginning of
August. See generally id. at 478-656 (covering the period of July 27 through August 14).
70. See id. at 337 (suggesting, however, that one judge would be sufficient to consti-
tute a quorum).
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newspaper reports either, so it is very hard to guess precisely what
was on the mind of the Judiciary Committee when it drafted its ini-
tial report.
Nevertheless, inferences can be made based on both the de-
bates that followed the committee's report and the perceived
problems of the judiciary at the time of the convention. Perhaps the
best illustration of the latter is a speech given in May of 1867, appar-
ently by Orville Horwitz,7 who was a prominent lawyer of the time
but not a convention delegate. 72 Horwitz identified three pressing
issues for the delegates to consider: the mode of appointment of
judges; the tenure and salary of judges; and "[t]he system of ad-
ministering the laws." 73
With regard to the appointment of judges, Horwitz said that
"the Election ofJudges by the people has proved a melancholy fail-
ure all over the country."' 74 His views on the perils of an elected
judiciary echo even today, albeit in a strange accent:
Ought not he, who will yield to the requirements of party
and to the promises exacted by whippers-in, who will con-
sent to travel, up to his knees in mire, the filthy road to
promotion that now lies before the aspirant,-ought not he
to be at once rejected as utterly unfitted for the ermine? 75
To Horwitz, the elective system meant that "mere politicians and
place-hunters" would become judges, and the $3000 salary limit
could not "command a very high order of politician" at that.76
71. I say "apparently" because I have found only one copy of the speech, in the
collection of the Maryland Historical Society. The speech is in monograph format and
titled "Views for the Consideration of the Convention in regard to the Judiciary." It is
signed "O.H., Baltimore, May, 1867." "0. Horwitz" is handwritten in pencil on the
front page, probably the notation of an early librarian since the name appears next to a
note saying, "From JJ. Cohen, 8/13 1879."
It should be noted that various other conventions took place in Baltimore around
this time. While it is not known which convention Horwitz was addressing, plainly his
subject was the constitutional convention then meeting in Annapolis. The speech be-
gins, "Of all the subjects that will be presented to the consideration of the Convention
now assembled at Annapolis .... Orville Horwitz, Views for the Consideration of the Con-
vention in Regard to the Judiciary 1 (May 1867), in MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY RECORD
[hereinafter Horwitz].
72. Horwitz, along with S. Teackle Wallis, had successfully represented the defend-
ants in a famous action to enjoin the constitutional convention. See Perlman, supra note
57, at 9-27. For other biographical information, see BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF REP-
RESENTATIVE MEN OF MARYLAND AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 227 (1879).
73. Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1.
74. Id. (emphasis omitted).




Horwitz advocated the creation of a twelve-member "Judicial
Commission," which would recommend judges to the senate for
confirmation.77 Judges would be paid at least $5000-"[i]t has al-
ways seemed strange to us that the Judge of a Court should receive
less than his clerk" 7-- and they would serve during good behav-
ior-"absolutely essential to the independence of a Judge [is] that
he should not be liable to lose his place on every change of politics
in the majority of the people." 79
Horwitz explained how competent judges would improve the
administration of the judicial system:
Having obtained competent and independent Judges,
the next inquiry is as to the best mode of distributing the
Courts so as to administer the laws with the greatest effi-
ciency and in the best way to secure the confidence of suit-
ors. The object of this confidence is to prevent, not to
increase litigation. If parties to a suit are satisfied of the
learning, wisdom, and impartiality of the Bench, they will
be willing to abide by the decision of the Court, and ap-
peals will be rare. Now everything is appealed from, and
the decisions of most of the inferior courts (if the cases are
at all complicated) are sure to be reversed on some of the
points by the appellate tribunal. In this way the chances
are in favor of the appellant, and the losing party below is
sure to take those chances.80
Horwitz clearly wanted to decrease the number of appeals, which he
thought could be done by improving the quality of the trial courts.
He reiterated this point when he discussed his plan for the state ju-
dicial system as a whole, which was similar in important ways to the
final plan adopted at the convention. Horwitz proposed that one
judge be appointed from each county to serve as a trial judge. In
addition, he proposed dividing the state into six "Judicial Districts"
and appointing one additional judge from each.8 These six judges
would constitute the Court of Appeals-although they would also sit
in trials that involved over $1000. The judges of two adjoining
counties together with the district judge from that district would
form a circuit court.82 Horwitz thought that, "[a]s . . . the Courts
77. See id. at 3-5 (also suggesting that the commission be selected in a manner so as
to lose its political character).
78. Id. at 5-6.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 6.
81. See id. at 7. The City of Baltimore alone would constitute one of the six districts.
82. Id.
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below will consist, in all cases of importance, of three able and effi-
cient Judges, and of two Judges in all other cases, it is believed that
the number of appeals will be greatly diminished .... s83
Horwitz's plan for Baltimore City called for, among other
things, two separate common-law courts, each of which would have
three-judge benches. Here, Horwitz was even more explicit on the
value of three judges:
A tribunal presided over by three able and impartial
Judges will command the respect of the community and
will diminish litigation. Errors that might well creep into a
court composed of a single Judge, would be avoided where
an opportunity for consultation is afforded. Qualities, too,
that might be wanting in one Judge would in all probability
be supplied by another. The fulness of the learning of one
might very well be compensated by the clearness with
which that learning would be applied by another, or the
practical experience that the third might bring to bear on
the question. A court composed in this wise of learning,
ability and experience, would satisfy the public wants and
insure the public confidence.84
At this point it is fair to ask what Orville Horwitz's thoughts on
three-judge courts have to do with the introduction of the in banc
provision. After all, Horwitz never spoke about in banc reviews, nor
is it certain that his ideas were communicated to the delegates at
Annapolis.85 But Horwitz's justifications for a three-judge trial
court are equally applicable to an in banc review panel consisting of
three trial judges. Because the convention adopted a modified
three-judge system," in which all three judges could sit but only
one would constitute a quorum, it is possible that the delegates in-
tended the in banc panel to solve the same problems Horwitz in-
tended to solve with his three-judge courts.87 It is useful, therefore,
to note that Horwitz never mentioned a concern that poor persons
were loath to press appeals because of the delay and expense of a
trip to Annapolis. On the contrary, he was concerned that there
were too many appeals already, and that this was expensive for the
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8.
85. See supra note 71.
86. See MD. CONST. of 1867, art. IV, § 21, reprinted in EDWARD 0. HINKLEY, THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND 68-70 (1868).





Horwitz's ideas were not all original; in fact many had been dis-
cussed only three years before at the Convention of 1864. Dele-
gates at the Convention of 1864 voiced other complaints about the
one-judge judiciary as well. There were, for instance, frequent com-
plaints about contacting a judge who covered such a large area.
One delegate complained that "if an injunction were needed . . .
[m]en have ridden fifty, sixty or one hundred miles, in an inclement
season, over roads which were almost impassable, then to find that
the judge had gone to another part of his circuit."' 89 Delegates also
complained that the one-judge system inevitably required a number
of "special judges"--temporaries who were both expensive and
incompetent.90
2. Mr. Syester's Speech on the Judiciary System.-Conventional
sources imply that the in banc provision sprang full-grown from the
head of Richard H. Alvey on July 22, 1867, and slipped into the
constitution without much discussion.9 ' In fact, there does not ap-
pear to be any model of in banc review under earlier Maryland judi-
cial systems, and neither the delegates nor the Court of Appeals
ever referred to an out-of-state analogue, although there was a simi-
lar statutory provision that had applied to the Philadelphia District
Court since 1835,92 which was extended to other Pennsylvania trial
courts in 1863.9  Moreover, Alvey, who was not a member of the
Judiciary Committee, introduced section 22 as a fairly complete
amendment to the initial Judiciary Committee Report without any
88. See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 8 (justifying the increased salaries of judges under
the Horwitz system by noting that "[t]he costs of one hundred cases finally disposed of
without appeal would save the increased expenditure").
89. 3 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND
1438 (1864) (statement of Mr. Stockbridge) [hereinafter 1864 DEBATES].
90. See 3 id. at 1439 (statement of Mr. Jones).
91. See Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 396, 404 A.2d 1027, 1029 (1979);
see also Perlman, supra note 57, at 333.
92. See Act of Mar. 28, 1835, No. 63, § 8, 1835 Pa. Laws 88. The Pennsylvania ver-
sion, which survives today, see PA. R. Civ. P. 227.2, has always had an emphasis on mo-
tions for new trials. The 1835 version read as follows:
The motions for new trials, and in arrest of judgment, and questions on re-
served points, which may be made and sustained before any one of the judges
of the said District Court, shall be reserved by the said judges, and heard and
decided by the three judges of the said court, or any two of them, sitting to-
gether for that purpose.
Act of Mar. 28, 1835, No. 63, § 8, 1835 Pa. Laws 88.
93. Act of Apr. 22, 1863, No. 545, 1863 Pa. Laws 554.
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apparent provocation.94 But the context of the debates from the
preceding sessions suggests a clear reason why Alvey introduced the
in banc provision, and, moreover, suggests that the idea might not
have been Alvey's after all.
July 22, Alvey's big day, was a Monday. On the preceding
Thursday and Friday, July 18 and 19, the delegates had taken up
consideration of section 20 of the Judiciary Committee Report,
which was the blueprint for a three-judge judiciary. 95 The commit-
tee's version called for eight circuits, seven of which were covered
by the three-judge system of section 20.96 Each circuit consisted of
two associate judges and one chief judge. The seven chief judges
plus one judge from Baltimore City composed the Court of Ap-
peals.9 7 Section 20 also provided that one judge from each of the
seven three-judge circuits would constitute a quorum, which pre-
sumably would mean that most trial benches would consist of only
one judge, although all three judges could sit together at their
discretion.9"
Toward the end of the day on Thursday, July 18, Henry W.
Archer, an attorney and farmer from Harford County,99 moved to
strike out all of section 20.100 Archer was an influential advocate of
the one-judge system at the convention and he had written and in-
troduced a minority report of the Judiciary Committee about three
weeks earlier.' 0 ' The minority report divided the state into twelve
judicial circuits, with one judge for each circuit except the one con-
stituting Baltimore City.'0 2 Archer's plan would have required all
judges except those in Baltimore City to ride circuit by holding
court at various times in each of the counties of their circuit. 10 3
According to The Sun, Archer "addressed the Convention at
considerable length"'0 4 concerning his motion to strike out section
20. Unfortunately, there is no detailed record of what Archer said.
The Baltimore American did print a brief summary, in which Archer
94. Perlman, supra note 57, at 333. Alvey's original provision was changed in several
important ways, however. See infra text accompanying notes 135-142.
95. Perlman, supra note 57, at 266, 327-31.




99. PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 848.
100. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 327.
101. PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 360-64.
102. Id. at 361-62.
103. Id. at 362.
104. Perlman, supra note 57, at 327.
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complained, in a modification of the alabaster-bust theory, that
"when three Judges were on the bench it generally happened that
the one superior mind controlled the others."'' 5 Further, he
wished that his fellow delegates would consider "the expense of a
three Judge system, where, if they gave them enough salary, the ex-
pense would be great, and if they did not pay enough salary they
would have bad Judges."' °6 Archer "believed in giving good sala-
ries and giving Judges plenty of work."' 0 7
Additional sources suggest other complaints expressed by
Archer and his fellow delegates. For instance, during the drive to
ratify the constitution, a newspaper in Cecil County, which would
have been part of Archer's district under the new constitution, pub-
lished an attack on the three-judge concept:
The new judiciary professes to be a three Judge sys-
tem, which the people abolished in 1850, but in fact we pay
for three Judges and only get one. One Judge of the three
is to set on the Court of Appeals. He can't stay at home to hold
court. If the two others sit together, then as two counties
are put together where now each has its own court, each
county must sit only half as many days of court as now
although it pays more for it. If each of the two Judges hold
court in each county separately, then we have got the only
one Judge system at last, only we pay the Judges more-
that's all.' 08
Archer also might have echoed the logic of a one-judge proponent
at the Convention of 1864, who had argued that "business is more
rapidly transacted under one-judge [sic]," because "of the very time
consumed in consultation about the propositions submitted before
[three judges] can decide upon them."' 0 9 This particular critic
would hear nothing of the complaint of sixty-mile rides to find a
judge in another part of the circuit:
[W]hat different state of things do you have under this
system from that under the one-judge system? The court is
sitting in Allegany county, for instance. Must not the three
judges be there?... And when the court went to Frederick
county, would not the citizens of Washington and Allegany
have the trouble of coming over the mountains to
105. AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER (Baltimore), July 19, 1867, at 4.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The New Constitution, THE CECIL WHIG (Elkton, Md.), Sept. 7, 1867, at 1.
109. 3 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1549-50.
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Frederick . .. ? 110
Archer was the last speaker on July 18. The next day virtually
all the debates concerned section 20. The first substantive speaker
was Andrew K. Syester, who was probably a friend of Alvey-both
were Democratic delegates, both were lawyers from Hagerstown, in
Washington County, and both had been Southern sympathizers dur-
ing the Civil War."' Syester was known at the convention for his
oratorical ability,' " 2 so it is likely that his speech on the judiciary was
influential. The Sun and the American apparently were unimpressed,
however, because they each printed only a paragraph-long summary
of his speech." 3 The paragraph in the American, however, included
an important detail that The Sun omitted: "[Mr. Syester] proposed
that the three Judges should also hold a court of revision in each
district, and to this the poor man could take an appeal when he
could not afford to go up to the Court of Appeals of the State."'14
So Syester appears to have articulated the idea of in banc review
before Alvey, and according to the American's report, Syester's pur-
pose was indeed to protect the appeal rights of poor persons.
In fact, Syester's hometown newspaper, The Hagerstown Mail,
printed a much more detailed account of his speech." '5 That ac-
count reveals that Syester started off with a passionate defense of
110. 3 id. at 1550.
111. 2 WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 985 (giving biographical information about Sy-
ester); see 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 234-35 (1927) (discussing Alvey). Like
Alvey, Syester also lived a rich life at the bar. In 1871 he was elected Attorney General
of Maryland, and in 1882 he became a judge on the circuit court for Washington, Al-
legany, and Garrett counties, where he served with Chief Judge Alvey. 2 WILLIAMS,
supra, at 985. As an attorney Syester was involved in several notable cases, including the
prosecution of Mrs. Elizabeth G. Wharton for poisoning General Ketchum, in which he
became known for the following cross-examination of a prominent Baltimore physician:
Syester: "Are not doctors' mistakes sometimes buried six feet under ground?"
Dr. Warren: "Yes, and lawyers' mistakes are sometimes hung six feet above
ground."
2 id.; see generally The Wharton Trial, 68 U.S. L. REV. 359 (1934).
112. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 210 (delegate describing the "sonorous voice and
mellifluous tones" of Mr. Syester); 2 WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 984.
113. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 328 (reprinting the summary that appeared in The
Sun); AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER (Baltimore), July 20, 1867, at 4.
114. AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER (Baltimore), July 20, 1867, at 4.
115. See Mr. Syester's Speech on the Judiciary System, THE HAGERSTOWN MAIL, Aug. 2,
1867, at 2 (available on microfilm at the Maryland Historical Society). The Mail did not
give a date for Syester's speech, but cross-references to The Sun and the American make it
likely that it was the speech ofJuly 19. In addition, the Mail admitted that "[t]his report
is necessarily imperfect, as there are no regular short-hand reporters employed; but im-
perfect as it is, it is a speech of great power, and demonstrates the inefficiency and ex-
pensive character of the present system ... ." Id.
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the three-judge system, and there is no doubt that he tried to con-
vince his colleagues of the merits of that system with, among other
things, a rather grandiloquent resort to the poor person's appeal
logic:
But there was a large class of people humble in life,
with but scanty means, struggling on with adversity, and
misfortune too poor [to] pay the uncommon fees necessary
to be paid counsel in prosecuting appeals.
There were thousands of people who have toiled along
the weary journey of life with but small gains, and limited
accumulations, people to whom the loss of a few hundreds
of dollars would produce bankruptcy, and whose families
would be beggared. To all such, the prosecution of an ap-
peal was a measure of so much hazard that a conscientious
lawyer would always advise a submission to even an unlaw-
ful ruling of the one judge, rather than put in jeopardy the
little all that his client possessed in the world." 6
According to the Mail, however, poor people were not Syester's
only concern. He mentioned two other reasons that review by a
three-judge panel was desirable. First, Syester argued that appeals
were not allowed in criminal cases, and that a criminal defendant's
life should not rest solely on the decision of one judge. 17 Syester
acknowledged that a motion for a new trial was a form of revision,
but he believed that it was an ineffective means of correcting a single
judge's erroneous ruling that might take the life of a defendant.
The new trial motion "requires the judge to say today that he was
wrong yesterday," and "[v]ery few Judges have ever admitted
that."" 8 To Syester, providing three-judge review of criminal deci-
sions was a basic issue of fairness.
Syester was technically correct in proclaiming that appeals were
not allowed in criminal cases;"19 however, the Court of Appeals




119. See 2 JOHN P. POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF COMMON LAw § 822, at
773 (1882). In 1872, the legislature granted a limited right of appeal in criminal cases,
but it came with a qualification that seems quite alien to modem criminal procedure:
In all trials upon any indictment or presentment in any court of this State
having criminal jurisdiction, it shall be lawful for any party accused, or for the
State's Attorney . . . to except to any ruling or determination of the court ...
and the party tendering such bill of exceptions, may appeal from such ruling or
determination to the Court of Appeals; provided that the counsel for the accused
shall make oath that such appeal is not taken for delay; and such appeal shall be
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mon-law method that had about the same scope as the statutory
right of appeal.l22 But to Syester there must have been some differ-
ence between civil and criminal appellate rights, because he was
quite clear in his complaint: "You give the right of appeal to suit-
ors, where $50 are involved, in a civil case ... and yet where a citi-
zen's life is at stake, it is denied."' 2' It is hard to say exactly what
difference Syester was referring to. It is clear, for instance, that the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over habeas cases,12 2 but Sy-
ester was not explicitly referring to habeas. More likely, however,
he was simply referring to the fact that it was much more convenient
to obtain appellate review by appeal than by writ of error. 1 2
In any event, it seems clear that Syester intended in banc review
to be available especially when appellate review was not available or
was difficult to obtain. This view reinforces a forgotten clause in
Alvey's explanation of the in banc rule in Roth v. House of Refuge. 1 24
In that case, Alvey launched the poor person's appeal theory by sug-
gesting that in banc review would cut the delay and expense of a
normal appeal. The neglected message from Alvey's passage, how-
ever, is that in banc review would give parties "the benefit of such
review in many important cases where an appeal will not lie."'' 25
Syester also worried about the new judiciary's burden on the
taxpayer, and it was in this context that he turned to the idea of a
three-judge court of revision, thus clearly foreshadowing the intro-
duction of section 22:
It is intended, that all [ill-considered rulings of one
judge] shall be reserved at the instance of the party, for the
consideration of the three judges. And these reserved
points are to be taken without the addition of one dollar's
heard by the Court of Appeals at the earliest convenient day after same shall
have been transmitted to the said court ....
Act of April 1, 1872, ch. 316, 1872 Md. Laws 503. In one of the first cases interpreting
this law, the Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal of a conviction for "selling lager beer
to a minor" because no counsel took the oath. See Weir v. State, 39 Md. 434, 434
(1874). In fact, no counsel appeared for the defendant at all in the Court of Appeals.
The State was represented by its Attorney General, Andrew K. Syester. Id.
120. 2 POE, supra note 119, § 822, at 773.
121. Mr. Syester's Speech on the Judiciary System, supra note 115, at 1.
122. See, e.g., Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329, 331 (1869); HUGH D. EVANS, A
TREATISE ON THE COURSE OF PROCEEDING IN THE COMMON LAW COURTS OF THE STATE OF
MARYLAND 538 (2d ed. 1867).
123. EVANS, supra note 122, at 545; see also HUGH D. EVANS, MARYLAND COMMON LAW
PRACTICE 421-32 (1839) (comparing writ of error to appeal).
124. 31 Md. 329 (1869).
125. Id. at 333; see also infra Subpart III.D.
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cost to the party, and heard and decided, without the addi-
tion of one dollar's cost to the public. For they are questions of
law, and the public are at no expense in keeping juries in
Court to hear them.
And just here it is very important to remember that the
expenses of a judicial system are not only the salaries paid
to Judges. That which falls heaviest on the people, is the
enormous costs of Jurors, Bailiffs, and States' Witnesses.
Long and anxious discussions on questions of law, consum-
ing days, take place before the singlejudge, the Jurors, bai-
liffs and witnesses, all the while spectators of the contest,
receiving their per diem. These discussions are intensified,
and lengthened out, because it is often felt by both parties,
that as it is the first, so it must be the last discussion. The
suitors on each side, are often too poor to warrant the hope
that an appeal can be resorted to. 12 6
The language in the first paragraph is quite similar to that in
section 22, and this indeed appears to be the birth of the in banc
provision. Interestingly, Syester's concern at this point is not with
the poverty of the people, but with the poverty of the state. It is
important to point out that perhaps the fiercest judiciary battles at
the convention were fought over costs. The delegates collected a
startling amount of financial and statistical information on the court
system at the beginning of the convention, and they continually
bickered over salaries and expenses of the judiciary throughout the
summer. Three-judge proponents like Syester were sensitive to ac-
cusations of financial extravagance, and they were under pressure to
limit the costs of their new judiciary, which, after all, would require
taxpayers to pay more judges. One way they limited costs was by re-
creating the circuit-riding Court of Appeals-requiring appellate
judges to sit at trials saved eight trial-judge salaries. It was Syester,
in fact, who calculated that the new judiciary would cost only
$12,000 more than the minority's proposed system, which appeared
to undercut the most powerful argument of the one-judge
proponents.127
Thus when Syester argued that the in banc rule would reduce
trial expenses for taxpayers, he probably sensed that he had found
an important compromise position. It would mollify the concerns of
absolute three-judge supporters like Orville Horwitz (who at the be-
ginning of the convention urged the delegates to adopt a complete
126. Mr. Syesters Speech on the Judiciary System, supra note 115, at 1.
127. See id. See generally Perlman, supra note 57.
[VOL. 51:434454
MARYLAND'S IN BANC REVIEW
three-judge system), because three-judge revision panels would re-
duce appeals as effectively as three-judge trials. It would be some-
what attractive to one-judge advocates like Henry Archer, because it
might reduce trial fees, which were paid by taxpayers, and it would
allow the three judges more time to be in separate parts of the cir-
cuit, which would minimize the sixty-mile rides through inclement
weather in pursuit of an injunction.
Mr. Syester's speech probably took a good portion of the Friday
morning session. After he sat down, the delegates spent the remain-
der of the day discussing the merits of the three-judge system. A
delegate from Queen Anne's County promoted the three-judge sys-
tem because "[i]t was harder to have three men act under a corrupt
influence than to have one man do so."' 2 8 On the other side, Henry
Farnandis, who, like the prominent Henry Archer, was an attorney
and farmer from Bel Air, stood to say that "the three Judge system
had been fairly tried and reasonably rejected."' 29 But a third dele-
gate questioned, "If one man's judgment be sufficient sitting upon
the bench, why not have only one man in the jury box?"' 0 The last
speaker, William N. Hayden of Carroll County, reported that in his
informal poll of twenty-three "legal gentlemen," eighteen sup-
ported the three-judge system.131 According to the American, the
Convention adjourned at 3:00 p.m. "until Monday morning at half
past 10 o'clock."' 32
3. The Introduction of Section 22.-It is not known whether Sy-
ester spoke with Alvey before the Monday session. It is possible that
the two men caught the same train back to Hagerstown for the
weekend. Alvey's habit when he was later a judge on the Court of
Appeals was to return home to Hagerstown by train every
weekend. 133
In any event, it is clear that Alvey and Syester were on the same
wavelength, because early in the session on Monday, Alvey intro-
duced what was then known as section 21, and what eventually be-
came section 22 of the constitution. 134 There seems to have been





133. See Armstrong, supra note 30, at 140.
134. The Sun reported Alvey's original motion as follows:
Where any term is held or trial conducted by one of said judges alone,
upon decision or determination of any point or question by him, it shall be
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little controversy over Alvey's amendment at its introduction. It is
clear that Alvey spoke in favor of the amendment, but there is no
record of what he said.
The proposed amendment, however, was different in several
ways from its final form; these differences illuminate Alvey's original
intent. For instance, Alvey's original amendment appears to have
articulated more clearly the relationship between in banc review and
an appeal to the Court of Appeals. He initially proposed that liti-
gants could choose in banc review, "or... elect to have [the court's]
decision or determination reserved on appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals, where by law an appeal will lie."'" 5 The implication was that the
scope of in banc review would be broader than that of appellate re-
view. Although in banc review clearly would be a substitute for an
appeal in most cases, the italicized language suggests that there
were some cases in which a litigant's only right of review would be
by an in banc panel.
For the next eight days there was no activity on the in banc pro-
vision. But the rules of the convention required multiple readings
of proposed sections,' 3 6 and on July 31, Alvey read his original
amendment again and then immediately submitted a substitute ver-
sion. The substitute did not include the election-of-appeal clause,
although there is no indication that the delegates intended to nar-
row the scope of in banc review by the deletion. The clause might
have been considered superfluous because section 22 never limits
competent to the party or parties against whom the ruling or decision is made,
upon motion, to have the point or question reserved for the consideration of
the three judges of the circuit, who shall constitute a court in banc for such
purpose, or said party or parties may elect to have said decision or determina-
tion reserved on appeal to the Court of Appeals, where by law an appeal will
lie; but in all cases of points or questions reserved, the motion therefor shall be
entered of record during the sitting at which such ruling or decision was made,
and such motion shall be a waiver of the right of appeal to the Court of Appeals
from such decision or judgment; and in order that the points or question re-
served may be fairly presented to the judges in banc, the said circuit judge
trying the cause shall make full and fair notes of such of the proceedings before
him, other than the pleadings, as will fully present such points or questions;
and the decision of the said judge in banc shall be effective determination of the
point or question reserved, and judgment or other proceedings shall be had
therefor. The right of having questions reserved shall not, however, apply to
trials of appeal from justices of the peace.
Perlman, supra note 57, at 333.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See RULES AND ORDERS FOR THE REGULATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 5 (1867) ("Every report from a committee, containing
articles or sections proposed to be made a part of the Constitution shall receive three
readings in the Convention, on three different days .... ").
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the right of in banc review to cases where an appeal will lie; on the
contrary, it says that "[w]here any term is held, or trial conducted by
less than the whole number of said Circuit Judges,"'13 7 a party may
have in banc review.
Alvey's amended section was amended yet again by several
small but important clauses. According to one newspaper's report,
after Alvey read the amended section, "Mr. Syester moved to insert
after the words 'all cases' the words 'civil and criminal,' which was
accepted by Mr. Alvey."l18 Apparently Syester again was concerned
about the review rights of criminal defendants, because the section
clearly addressed civil appeal rights. Syester's brief amendment is
perhaps more interesting, however, in that it tends to subvert the
theory that Syester and Alvey were working together on section
22-if they were, surely they would have decided upon this language
before the delegates met.
Mr. Hayden, another three-judge proponent, added a section
that limited criminal in banc review to felonies (or lesser crimes in
which punishment was confinement in the penitentiary).1 9 More
importantly, his amendment allowed section 22 to "be subject to
such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law."' 4 ° The power
to change the section by law became quite controversial,' 4 ' and it
does seem a strange provision to put into a constitution. Interest-
ingly, The Baltimore Gazette, which probably reported more thor-
oughly than other papers on this day's proceedings at the
convention, printed Hayden's amendment in a way that suggested
that the power-to-change provision applied only to the limitation of
in banc review to felonies. 142 But the other newspapers and the offi-
cial report of the convention all reported Hayden's amendment as it
137. Perlman, supra note 57, at 502 (emphasis added). See also infra Subpart III.D for
a discussion of how the Court of Appeals now treats the scope of in banc review as
compared with appellate review.
138. THE BALTIMORE GAZETTE, Aug. 1, 1867, at 1; see supra note 8 for the current text
of the provision. We can assume that Syester said "those cases" rather than "all cases"
because the latter words do not appear in section 22. Also note that the official proceed-
ings of the convention do not say that Syester introduced this amendment-the "civil
and criminal" language appears in Alvey's substitute. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE
CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 502.
139. Perlman, supra note 57, at 383.
140. Id.
141. See Montgomery County v. McNeece, 311 Md. 194, 533 A.2d 671 (1987);
Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979); see also infra Subparts
III.E and III.F.
142. The Gazette reported it thus: "Add to the end of the section 'nor to criminal cases
below the grade of felony, except where the punishment is confinement in the peniten-
tiary, and this shall be subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by law.' "
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ultimately appeared, so it is hard to believe that the clause slipped
into the constitution through a misunderstanding.
Apparently, the final word on section 22 at the convention went
to Mr. Archer, the leading proponent of the one-judge system. His
comment, reported only in the Gazette, was that "the adoption of this
additional section was absolutely necessary to the proper working of
the three-judge system."' 43 This may be the most revealing com-
ment available on section 22 because it suggests that the provision
was in fact a compromise between the two sides, which in turn sup-
ports the theory that Syester's original speech was largely a search
for a compromise position.
Recall that the delegates had already tentatively decided that
one judge would constitute a quorum, 144 so it was clear that one-
judge courts would be possible, if not the norm, under the new con-
stitution. The in banc review provision would placate many three-
judge supporters, especially the most ardent ones who may have
subscribed to Horwitz's ideas,' 45 because it solved most of the
problems that they saw with one-judge courts. If one judge was cor-
rupt or incompetent, a litigant could always call for in banc review
and have that corruption or incompetence tempered by two other
judges. Additionally, in banc panels presumably would reduce the
number of appeals and promote respect for the judiciary and finality
in litigation. After all, a three-judge panel would necessarily include
one judge from the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, the one-judge advocates could assume that
section 22 would reduce the demand for three-judge trials, because
the parties would know they could obtain three-judge review if they
chose. Therefore, ordinarily at least one judge could remain in each
county to tend to judicial business and hence to save the many law-
yer-delegates from the burden of sixty-mile horseback rides through
inclement weather in search of an emergency injunction. The one-
judge supporters were also worried about the expense of the three-
judge system, but perhaps these concerns were satisfied by the as-
sertion that three judges would cut state expenditures by reducing
the number of appeals.' 46 A three-judge review panel would be as
THE BALTIMORE GAZEIrE, Aug. 1, 1867, at 1. The differences here are the lack of a
semicolon after "penitentiary" and the lack of the word "Section" after "and this."
143. Id.
144. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 266.
145. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
146. The battle over the expense of the judiciary had been settled by another compro-
mise: while it was true that the three-judge system cost more, the requirement of double
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effective as a three-judge court in that respect. Moreover, there
could be no dispute that the right of reserving points of law, rather
than arguing them at trial, would cut down on the various per diem
expenses of jurors and court staff.
D. Summary
The in banc provision may have had several original purposes.
Certainly the three mentioned by Alvey in his 1869 House of Refuge
opinion have support. First, the notion that appeals were too ex-
pensive for some parties to prosecute seems to have concerned
some of the framers, and hence the poor person's appeal logic has
some credence. Second, the framers thought that the normal ap-
peals process delayed justice unreasonably, and they probably
thought that in banc review would alleviate that problem. Third,
the framers probably intended that in banc review provide for ap-
peals in some cases where appeals would not lie.
But Alvey did not exhaust the purposes of the in banc provision
in his House of Refuge aside. Most likely the provision was intended
as part of a compromise between a one-judge and a three-judge sys-
tem-one of the central judiciary debates in three of the four Mary-
land constitutions-and as such it surely was intended to serve the
purposes of the three-judge judiciary without demanding all of the
attendant expenses. Threejudges were thought to increase popular
respect for the judiciary, and thereby to reduce the number of ap-
peals. Many delegates believed that the three-judge system would
save money for the state, and there is in fact more evidence sug-
gesting that the delegates wanted to save state money than there is
suggesting that they wanted to save litigants' money. Additionally,
many delegates probably felt that three-judge review could counter-
balance single judges who might be corrupt or incompetent. Finally,
the modified three-judge system would make individual judges more
accessible.
The question remains whether modem in banc practice usefully
serves any of these purposes, or whether it serves other useful pur-
poses, or whether it is just useless.




III. IN BANC PRACTICE TODAY
A. Why Take an In Banc Review?
It seems clear that, at least on the civil side, the option of in
banc review is largely ignored. Although there are no statewide sta-
tistics on in banc reviews, jurisdictional and anecdotal evidence sug-
gest that in banc review is not near the top of most litigators' minds.
For instance, telephone calls to administrators of major Baltimore-
area trial courts brought such responses as "Oh, yes, I know what
you're talking about-we do maybe a one or two of those per
month." The Prince George's County administrator was able to be
more specific: eight civil in banc reviews were scheduled there in
1990, although it was not clear how many actually occurred.147 The
circuit judge in Garrett County, the most distant jurisdiction from
Annapolis, said he has participated in four in banc reviews since he
joined the court in 1977.141 On the other hand, there is a place for
criminal three-judge practice. There were 206 "applications for re-
view of criminal sentences" in fiscal year 1990, t4 ' although these
appear to be based more upon a separate statutory provision than
upon section 22.150
Of course, it is not obvious why any modern lawyer would
choose in banc review over the normal appellate route. It is true
that in banc review is both faster and cheaper than an appeal, just as
the delegates intended in 1867."5l In fact, the speed of in banc re-
view is due in large part to a wise series of changes made to rule 2-
551 in the 1980s, which the Court of Appeals promulgated partly in
recognition of the delegates' intent. Thus, initially one might think
that in banc review would be strategically attractive either when a
client did not have the time to wait for the Court of Special Appeals
or the money to prosecute an appeal there.
The problem is that parties seeking in banc review lose their
right to further appeal on the reviewed issues, but their opponents
do not. Thus, the opposing party controls the overall speed and
147. Telephone conversation with Pearl Morrissette, Office of the Chief Judge of
Prince George's County, Sept. 6, 1991.
148. Telephone conversation with Office ofJudge Fred A. Thayer, Oct. 28, 1991. In-
terestingly, all four were in the past two years.
149. 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 55 (1990).
150. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645JA (1987).
151. In fiscal year 1990, the average time from docketing to decision in the Court of
Special Appeals was about five and one-half months. 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICI-
ARY 35 (1990). An appeal to the Court of Appeals adds another ten and one-half months
from the time certiorari is granted. Id. at 26. An in banc review should take less than
three months. See MD. R. 2-551.
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expense of the appellate process: if the party seeking in banc review
wins, his opponent may (and likely will) delay the process and in-
crease the expense by appealing to the Court of Special Appeals.
The net effect of the in banc review is an increase in delay and ex-
pense, precisely the opposite of what was sought.
Nevertheless, there are at least three ways that an in banc re-
view might be useful outside the normal appellate process. First, if
an in banc panel remands to a circuit court for further proceedings,
one might argue that there is no final judgment for an opponent to
appeal. This would make in banc review attractive when the losing
party at trial believes the trial judge erred egregiously and any sub-
sequent tribunal will reverse and remand-an in banc panel will do
it more quickly and economically than the Court of Special Appeals.
Second, a trial judge's order for a new trial, ordinarily interlocutory
and thus not appealable, might be immediately reviewable by an in
banc court. Third, because the right to in banc review is constitu-
tional, and because the legislature may restrict appellate jurisdiction
by statute, '5 2 in banc review might be available even when appellate
jurisdiction is not.
The Court of Appeals, however, has judicially terminated all
three of these possibilities. The question is whether such decisions
make sense, and whether the Court of Appeals had constitutional
authority to make them.
B. The Appealability of an In Banc Order of Remand
Ordinarily a trial judge's order for a new trial is not immedi-
ately appealable, 53 but an intermediate appellate court's remand
for a new trial is immediately appealable to a higher court. 1 4 The
question arises whether an in banc panel of trial judges is a trial
court or an appellate court. The Court of Appeals has unequivo-
cally held-quite recently-that a remand by an in banc panel is im-
152. See, e.g., MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-202 (1989) (stating that certio-
rari will not be granted by the Court of Appeals when the Court of Special Appeals has
denied review from certain post-conviction proceedings); id. § 12-302(a) (generallybar-
fing appeal from courts reviewing district court or administrative dispositions).
153. See, e.g., MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1989) ("The right of appeal
exists from afinaljudgment entered by a court .... (emphasis added)); A.S. Abell Co. v.
Skeen, 265 Md. 53, 59-60, 288 A.2d 596, 599 (1972); Feinberg v. George Washington
Cemetery, Inc., 233 Md. 440, 441, 197 A.2d 147, 147 (1964). Note, however, that new
trial orders are reviewable on appeal when they accompany a disposition on a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See MD. R. 2-532(f)(1), 2-533(c).
154. See, e.g., Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 421 n.5, 404 A.2d 1040, 1043 n.5 (1979).
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mediately appealable by the losing party.' 55 The logic of that
opinion rests on the assumption that an in banc panel is, by long-
settled law, an appellate tribunal. It is enlightening to track the
cases backward to find just what authority the Court of Appeals has
relied upon in reaching that finding.
The court affirmed the doctrine most recently in Dabrowski v.
Dondalski,156 in which a trial judge had granted a defendant's motion
for judgment in a slip-and-fall case.' 57 An in banc panel reversed
and remanded for a new trial, and the defendant appealed. The
Court of Special Appeals held that the panel's order was not final,
and consequently was not appealable. Thus, the appeal was dis-
missed.' 5 8 The court relied on language in rule 2-551 saying that
the "decision of the panel does not preclude an appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals by an opposing party who is otherwise entitled to
appeal."'59 Evidently the court decided that an opposing party was
not entitled to appeal because there was no final judgment.
The Court of Appeals relied exclusively on earlier cases in hold-
ing that an in banc panel's remand was appealable. Specifically, it
said that Estep v. Estep 6 was dispositive.' 6 1 Procedurally, Estep was
equivalent to Dabrowski: the Court of Special Appeals had denied
review of an in banc panel's remand.' 62 Estep also was substantively
equivalent, because it relied exclusively on an earlier case, Buck v.
Folkers,'6 in which, according to the Estep opinion, the court had
"clearly indicated that the court in banc acts only as an appellate
tribunal so that its decisions are not those of a reconsidering trial
court but are reviewable as final appellate judgments."'"
155. See Dabrowski v. Dondalski, 320 Md. 392, 395, 578 A.2d 211, 213 (1990) (per
curiam); see also Board of License Comm'rs v. Haberlin, 320 Md. 399, 403, 578 A.2d 215,
217 (1990) (reaching the same conclusion on the same day as Dabrowski, and relying on
it).
156. 320 Md. 392, 578 A.2d 211 (1990) (per curiam).
157. Id. at 393, 578 A.2d at 212.
158. Dabrowski v. Dondalski, 77 Md. App. 747, 749-50, 551 A.2d 933, 934-35 (1989),
vacated, 320 Md. 392, 578 A.2d 211 (1990).
159. MD. R. 2-551(h) (emphasis added); see also MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22 ("[B]ut such
decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal, or writ of error to the adverse
party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which appeal, or writ of error to the Court of
Appeals may be allowed by Law.").
160. 285 Md. 416, 404 A.2d 1040 (1979).
161. See Dabrowski, 320 Md. at 395, 578 A.2d at 213.
162. The Court of Special Appeals issued no opinion. The Court of Appeals guessed
that the reason for the dismissal was that the in banc panel's order was interlocutory.
Estep, 285 Md. at 420-21, 404 A.2d at 1043.
163. 269 Md. 185, 304 A.2d 826 (1973).
164. Estep, 285 Md. at 421, 404 A.2d at 1043.
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Buck v. Folkers appears to be the root of the doctrine; however,
that case does not clearly indicate that the court in banc acts only as
an appellate tribunal. What the Buck court did say was that "[t]he
decision of the court en banc [sic] is conclusive, final, and non-ap-
pealable by the party who sought the en banc [sic] review," 165 and
that "[a]s to that party, a reservation of points or questions for con-
sideration by the Court en banc [sic] is a substitute for an appeal to
the Court of Appeals."' 66 Presumably the Estep court leapt from
Buck's proposition that an in banc panel is a "substitute for an ap-
peal" to the idea that the in banc panel acts only as an appellate
tribunal.
It is quite clear that an in banc review is a substitute for an ap-
peal-in the sense that the party seeking review waives certain rights
of appeal to the courts of appeal. This is made clear by the language
of section 22 itself,'6 7 as well as by case law interpretations of that
section.' 68 What is not clear, and what is not explained in any Court
of Appeals opinion, is why the fact that in banc review is a substitute
for an appeal makes an in banc panel an appellate tribunal. After
all, parties may waive their rights of appeal without actually
appealing.
It appears that no court has ever addressed this issue by looking
for the original intent of the delegates at the Convention of 1867.
The first part of this Comment introduced some evidence sug-
gesting that the in banc panel was intended to be more of a trial
court than an appellate court. For instance, in Syester's original
speech on the in banc provision, he seems to have envisioned the in
banc rule as a way to speed up trials by reserving the many lengthy
arguments on legal issues for a later time, when the three judges
would be available to resolve them. (Syester never used the word
appeal when speaking of in banc review; nor, for that matter, did any
other delegate.) Alvey wrote the "reservation" language into the
original constitutional provision, where it remains today. The pro-
165. Buck, 269 Md. at 187, 304 A.2d at 827.
166. Id.
167. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22 ("and the decision of the said Court in banc shall be
the effective decision . . . and conclusive, as against the party, at whose motion said
points, or questions were reserved; but such decision in banc shall not preclude the right
of Appeal ... to the adverse party"). Alvey's original version of § 22 was even clearer:
"[I]t shall be competent to the party... against whom the ruling... is made ... to have
the point or question reserved ... or said party or parties . . . may elect to have said
decision or determination reviewed on appeal to the Court of Appeals . Perlman,
supra note 57, at 333.
168. See, e.g., Shueey v. Stoner, 47 Md. 167, 170 (1877).
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vision says that parties may "have [a] point or question reserved for
the consideration of the three Judges of the Circuit"' 69 -which
seems a strange way to express the concept of an appeal to a higher
court, if that is what was intended.
It is important to remember that when section 22 was intro-
duced, the three judges of the circuit had the discretion to sit to-
gether at many trials.' 70 When all three judges sat at trial, there was
no need, and hence no right, to in banc review because all judges
were immediately available to settle difficult questions of law. If, as
is suggested above, 7 ' the in banc provision really was part of a com-
promise between the one- and three-judge systems, then it is easy to
imagine in banc review as an extension of a trial rather than as an
appeal. The absolute three-judge proponents, those who wanted
three judges to sit for the full trial, at every trial,' 72 might have ac-
quiesced to a de facto one-judge system so long as litigants had a
right to convene the three judges to answer difficult questions of
law. In many cases, presumably, no need for three judges would
arise. Therefore the judiciary would work more economically with a
single judge sitting in most cases, provided that the right of review
by an in banc panel was preserved.
In light of this context, section 22 may be read to mean that the
in banc review was really an extension of the trial. As pointed out
above, the reservation-of-points concept suggests that the real trial
decision is not made until disposition of the points reserved. 73
Moreover, the reservation had to be made "during the sitting" (later
interpreted to mean on the same day174 ), which may suggest that the
record of the trial court was to be left open until the panel decided
the reserved points. Indeed, Alvey's initial version of section 22
said that "the decision of the said judges in banc shall be the effec-
tive determination of the point or question reserved, and judgment
or other proceedings shall be had therefor."' 175 The implication
again is that when points had been reserved, judgment came after
the in banc proceedings, not after the trial. The final version of sec-
tion 22 suggests the same concept: "[T]he decision of the said
169. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
170. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 266. Section 20 of the original judiciary report
fixed three judges per circuit and provided that one would constitute a quorum.
171. See supra Subpart II.D.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 71-84 for the views of one such advocate.
,173. See supra text accompanying note 169.
* 174. See Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 124, 3 A. 285, 285 (1886).
175. Perlman, supra note 57, at 333.
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Court in banc shall be the effective decision in the premises."' 17 6 The
term premises probably is used in its pleading sense, where it means
"t]hat which is put before."' 177 Thus, the effective decision of the
matters put before (the reserved point) is the decision of the in banc
panel.
This interpretation is supported by a standard nineteenth-cen-
tury definition of the term point reserved:
A point or question of law, which the court, not being fully
satisfied how to decide, in the trial of a cause, rules in favor
of the plaintiff, but subject to revision on a motion for a new trial.
If, after argument, it be found to have been ruled correctly,
the verdict is supported; if otherwise, it is set aside.'7 1
Under this definition it seems quite clear that reserved points ordi-
narily stayed within the jurisdiction of a trial court. Given Alvey's
fondness for dictionaries and verbal precision, 7 ' it seems unlikely
that he would have used this term if he intended the in banc panel to
act in an appellate capacity. Moreover, this definition squares with
one of Syester's original purposes for the in banc rule: to prevent
long arguments on questions of law at trial, when the jury and court
staff were drawing pay.' 80
There are no relevant Court of Appeals cases early enough to
illuminate the delegates' intent regarding whether an in banc panel
acts as an appellate or trial court. There are a few early cases involv-
ing the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City that support the theory of
in banc panel as a trial court extension. For instance, in Merrick v.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 18 a Baltimore City trial judge refused
a motion to strike a judgment that had been obtained by default.
The Supreme Bench reversed, ordering that the judgment be
stricken and the case remanded for trial.'8 2 Judge Alvey dismissed
the appeal taken to the Court of Appeals.' He relied on a case
176. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
177. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1062-63 (5th ed. 1979); see also 2 JOHN BOUVIER, Bou-
VIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 729 (Francis Rawle ed., 1897) (defining "premises" as: "That
which is put before. The introduction. Statements previously made").
178. 2 BOUvIER, supra note 177, at 689 (emphasis added).
179. Judge Alvey did not choose his words casually, however haphazardly he may have
strung them together at times. See Armstrong, supra note 30, at 137 ("My younger
brother's outstanding recollection of the Judge is that he was always reading the diction-
ary. It is true that he was constantly consulting that work, in his search for synonyms
and finer shades of meaning.").
180. See supra text accompanying notes 126-127.
181. 33 Md. 481 (1871).
182. Id. at 484-85.
183. See id. at 487.
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that held that, so long as the motion to strike was made during the
same term as the judgment, no appeal to the Court of Appeals
would lie if the motion was granted because "the rights of neither
party are determined, and the case stands for trial immediately, and
the plaintiff may proceed with the trial at the same term."'81 4 Of
course, the Supreme Bench was not equivalent to an in banc panel,
but in Merrick as in House of Refuge, Judge Alvey invoked the analogy
between the two.' 8
5
Nevertheless, whether the delegates intended the in banc panel
to act as a trial or appellate court is an open question at best. The
question today is not so much whether the Court of Appeals has the
authority to disallow immediate appeal of an in banc panel's re-
mand, but whether it should. It seems that if the court has an inter-
est in meaningful in banc review, it should. In many cases, the most
a litigant can hope for on post-trial proceedings is a new trial. As in
banc practice now stands, in such cases it is foolish to seek in banc
review because a victory only means that the opponent will appeal
to the Court of Special Appeals, and a loss means no further appeal
at all.
On the other hand, if the Court of Appeals disallowed immedi-
ate appeal of in banc remands, the state judicial system would have
to endure a few more trials that the appellate courts would deem
unnecessary. But in fact such a rule might conserve total judicial
resources because some of the parties who seek in banc review are
going to lose, which will mean neither a new trial nor an appeal to
the courts of appeal.
C. Immediate Review of New Trial Orders
The argument that the in banc panel is really an extension of a
trial court supports another idea that could make in banc review
more useful. If the in banc panel is really part of the trial court, then
the trial judge's orders are not necessarily interlocutory with respect
to the panel, and therefore the panel would have authority to review
immediately a trial judge's order of a new trial.'8 6 Thus, a party
184. Hall v. Holmes, 30 Md. 558, 561 (1869); cf 1 JOHN P. POE, MARYLAND PLEADING
AND PRACTICE 669 (1880) (an appeal from an order arresting a judgment lies
immediately).
185. See Mernick, 33 Md. at 485.
186. For a statutory basis of the final judgment rule, see MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 12-301 (1989) ("The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a
court ....").
I do not mean to suggest that litigants should be allowed to take continuous inter-
locutory reviews to an in banc panel throughout the course of the trial. Plainly the con-
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who won a jury verdict but faced a new trial after losing on a post-
verdict motion would have immediate review before incurring the
expense of a second trial.
The value of allowing such review is debatable, of course, but
that debate has been moot since at least 1985, when the Court of
Appeals definitively ended any speculation. In Dean v. State,I s 7 a
jury convicted Dean of various crimes and the trial judge granted
Dean's motion for a new trial.' The state sought in banc review,
and the in banc panel vacated the new-trial order, reinstated the
convictions, and remanded for sentencing.'8 9 Dean's appeal went
straight to the Court of Appeals, which held that:
Whatever the theory of the State's Attorney for Mont-
gomery County may have been in seeking review by the in
banc court, the Attorney General says before us that he
does not contend that there is any different standard of ap-
pealability to a court in banc from that to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals. There is no different standard.
It is clear that the order from which the State sought to
appeal in this case was not an appealable final order and
thus the in banc court was without jurisdiction to consider
the point reserved.' 9 °
The problem with such a broad holding is that it "appear[s] to
narrow the right that the Constitution granted to review 'any point
or question.' ""91 Indeed, if the original delegates viewed the in
banc panel as an extension of the trial, it makes sense to assume that
they granted the panel immediate authority to review points or
questions that were otherwise interlocutory to an appeals court.
Trial judges have authority to reverse themselves during the trial.
The concept that an in banc panel only overruled its own (rather
than a lower court's) decisions was perhaps easier to grasp in 1867
than it is today-remember that in 1867, at least one of the judges
vention delegates never intended the trial to be suspended while someone rounded up
the other two judges, who may have been in far-flung parts of the circuit. Indeed, the
point of the provision was, at least in part, judicial economy. But a new trial order is
unlike most other interlocutory orders-it occurs, as Hemingway once wrote, at the end
of something.
187. 302 Md. 493, 489 A.2d 22 (1985).
188. Id. at 494, 489 A.2d at 22.
189. Id. at 495-96, 489 A.2d at 23. It is not clear why the state sought in banc review.
190. Id. at 497, 499, 489 A.2d at 24, 25; see also Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 421,404
A.2d 1040, 1043 (1979) (reaching essentially the same conclusion in less forceful
language).
191. NIEMEYER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 84 (Supp. 1988).
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on the three-judge panel would have sat at the trial and made the
initial ruling, because there were only three judges in each of the
circuits.' 92
The Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, which Alvey analogized
to in banc courts in Roth v. House of Refuge, ta3 did have jurisdiction
"to hear and determine all motions for a new trial" from any of the
various city courts.' 94 It is not clear, however, whether at that time a
city trial judge could hear the motion first, and if he granted the
motion, whether the Supreme Bench could rule on the motion as
well. 95
Thus, the history of the in banc provision provides a plausible,
though not airtight, rationale for the Court of Appeals to allow im-
mediate in banc review of new trial orders. The question is whether
the Court of Appeals should invoke either its rule-making or judicial
powers to implement such a policy. It would be quite valuable in
some situations to have immediate review of a new trial order, par-
ticularly those situations in which the trial judge has made a clear
error and a new trial will be long, complicated, and expensive-both
to the parties and to the state. In such situations it might be worth-
while to have a relatively fast review by three trial judges who have
time to focus on the particular error. If the in banc panel vacates
the order for a new trial, the opposing party would of course have a
right of appeal-but the appeal might have occurred anyway, after
the second trial. If the in banc panel upholds the order, the new
192. This system excluded Baltimore City, to which the in banc rule did not apply. See
infra Subpart III.F.
In 1979, the Court of Appeals decided that "the three judges of the circuit" meant
only three judges, and not all the judges of the circuit. Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285
Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (discussed infra Subpart III.F). Although the
court made several arguments, probably the most important was its textual one: "the
constitutional drafters' specific use of the term 'three,' as opposed to a reference to 'all'
the judges of the circuit, demands that any ambiguity be resolved in favor of treating
'three' as a numerical rather than a descriptive term." Id. at 411, 404 A.2d at 1037.
While the court's result is not at all implausible, it seems that among Maryland lawyers
in the middle nineteenth century the "three" in "three judges" was used more descrip-
tively than numerically-or at least that is one of the premises of this Comment. In any
event, as a practical matter the court was wise to limit in banc review to three judges. In
Washabaugh, one of the cases on appeal came from the Seventh judicial Circuit, in which
allfifteen judges of that circuit sat together. One wonders how such a meeting was ever
scheduled. Surely if circuits made a regular practice of sitting in toto to hear garden
variety in banc reviews, the process would lose its advantage of speed.
193. 31 Md. 329 (1869).
194. BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. XIII, § 7 (1869).
195. The Supreme Bench appears to have had a system similar to one that still exists
in Pennsylvania, in which a trial judge may decide whether to submit new trial motions
to a court in banc or to decide them alone. See PA. R. Civ. P. 227.2.
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trial would continue, but the party who sought review by the in banc
panel would be precluded from appealing the new trial motion (and
the issues it included) at the end of the second trial.
D. "Many Important Cases Where No Appeal Will Lie"
In banc practice would be substantially more powerful if it were
allowed in certain cases in which no appeal is available. This possi-
bility, however, was probably eliminated by the recent case of Board
of License Commissioners v. Haberlin.'9 6 In that case, Haberlin con-
tested the transfer of a neighboring business's liquor license and
lost at both the administrative and circuit court levels. 197 He then
sought in banc review, and the in banc panel reversed and re-
manded on one of the issues.'9 ' The License Board appealed, and
the Court of Appeals on its own raised the issue of whether the in
banc panel had statutory authority to review the case.' 99 The statute
at issue did not allow appeal of administrative cases beyond the cir-
cuit court level unless separate circuit courts disagreed on an
issue.2 oo
The Court of Appeals held that, as a general proposition, an in
banc panel does not have jurisdiction unless it is expressly author-
ized by the legislature under section 12-301 of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article. 20 ' The court's logic derives from a two-
step argument made in the Estep case: First, an in banc panel is an
appellate court, and second, an appellate court's jurisdiction is en-
tirely statutory. 20 2 Therefore, according to Haberlin, if the legisla-
ture did not authorize appellate authority in a given case, or if
"appeal to a court in banc would be inconsistent with special appel-
late statutory provisions, "203 an in banc panel could have no juris-
diction. In Haberlin, because the relevant statute expressly cut off
most appellate jurisdiction, the court held that in banc jurisdiction
was cut off as well.2°4 To overcome the possible constitutional
problem with section 22's right of review over "any point or ques-
tion," the court cited that section's troublesome final passage saying
that in banc review is "subject to such provisions as may hereafter
196. 320 Md. 399, 578 A.2d 215 (1990).
197. Id. at 401-02, 578 A.2d at 216.
198. Id. at 402-03, 578 A.2d at 217.
199. See id. at 405, 578 A.2d at 218.
200. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 175(f) (1990).
201. See Haberlin, 320 Md. at 407, 578 A.2d at 219.
202. Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 421-22, 404 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1979).
203. Haberlin, 320 Md. at 408, 578 A.2d at 219.
204. See id. at 409-10, 578 A.2d at 220.
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be made by Law." ' 0 5
Before considering the effect of the court's opinion and
whether it has historical basis, it should be pointed out that the
court could have cited at least one other textual argument to sup-
port its holding. Section 22 currently reads, "The right of having
questions reserved shall not.., apply to trials of Appeals from judg-
ments of the District Court . " Originally the exception applied
to trials of appeals from justices of the peace.20 6 One might argue
that the original intent of the provision was to prevent or limit in
banc review of decisions by trial courts when acting in their appel-
late capacity. There was little state administrative law in 1867, so it
was relatively rare for trial courts to act in an appellate capacity, and
the delegates' explicit retraction of in banc jurisdiction in one situa-
tion in which the circuit court was actually an appellate court might
suggest an intent to remove it in later, similar situations as well.
On the other hand, there are several reasons why one might
think that the delegates did intend in banc review to be available in
cases that were procedurally equivalent to Haberlin. The first is the
argument made in the preceding two sections: If the in banc panel
is not an appellate court but an extension of a trial court, then the
Estep logic disintegrates. Because the in banc panel would not be
seen as an appellate court, its jurisdiction comes from the constitu-
tional provision that created it-in this case, article IV, section 22-
and under that section the grant of jurisdiction appears to be quite
broad.20 7 Under this theory, in banc review of appeals to a circuit
court would generally be allowed under the broad right of review
granted by section 22; the final passage in section 22 might allow
the legislature to remove this jurisdiction, but only if it did so
explicitly.
Second, there is some evidence suggesting that the delegates
did foresee cases like Haberlin and would not have decided them the
same way. The most important evidence comes from the often-
quoted opinion in which Alvey wrote that in banc review was avail-
able in part so that parties could have "the benefit of such review in
many important cases where an appeal will not lie."208 Unfortu-
nately, Alvey did not describe the types of cases in which an appeal
would not lie, but it seems clear that, at minimum, he thought that
there was a different standard of appealability to a court in banc
205. Id. at 410, 578 A.2d at 220.
206. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 744-45.
207. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
208. Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329, 333 (1869).
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when compared to that of the Court of Appeals. 20 9 As we have al-
ready seen, Syester too thought that in banc review would provide
revision in at least some cases in which appellate review was not
available. 210
There is also some support for this view in the early case law.
For example, the case of Roth v. House of Refuge, 2 " already familiar
because of Alvey's dictum on the purpose of in banc review,21 2 actu-
ally held that the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City had power to
review a trial judge's determination of a habeas corpus petition even
though the Court of Appeals had no power to do so.2 1 3 Of course,
the Supreme Bench operated under a different constitutional au-
thority than the county circuit courts,2 14 and section 22 probably
never applied to the Baltimore City courts anyway. But Alvey's logic
in House of Refuge rested in part on an analogy of the Supreme Bench
to a court in banc.215 The implication, circuitous though it may be,
is that an in banc panel also had authority to review some kinds of
cases that the Court of Appeals could not hear.
In any event, Haberlin is another important step in the judicial
limitation of in banc practice. The text of section 22 implies that the
scope of in banc review perhaps was intended to be broader than
that of appellate review. Dean was on questionable ground in hold-
ing that "[t]here is no different standard" of appealability to the two
forums.216 Haberlin goes still further by holding that in fact there is
a different standard of appealability-in banc review is substantially
narrower than regular appellate review. 17 The Court of Appeals in
Haberlin went out of its way to include a nonexhaustive list of legisla-
tive jurisdictional provisions that now will have the ancillary effect of
cutting off in banc jurisdiction. 21 8 For instance, the court decided
that when the legislature provided for automatic appeal to the Court
209. See supra text accompanying notes 135-137 (suggesting that Alvey's original mo-
tion shows that he intended the scope of in banc review to be broader than that of the
normal appellate process); cf. Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493, 497, 489 A.2d 22, 24 (1985)
(finding the standard of appealability to be the same for in banc review and review by the
Court of Special Appeals).
210. See supra notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
211. 31 Md. 329 (1869).
212. See supra text accompanying note 29.
213. House of Refuge, 31 Md. at 332-33.
214. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 743-46.
215. See House of Refuge, 31 Md. at 333.
216. See Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493, 497, 489 A.2d 22, 24 (1985).





of Special Appeals within five days ofjudgment, it intended to elimi-
nate in banc jurisdiction, and the court will assume that it did. 21 9
Whether the legislature can alter a constitutional right by implica-
tion-even where the constitution provides for legislative altera-
tion 2 2 0-is still an open question, and one considered in the next
section.
E. McNeece and the Power to Change Section 22
Just why Mr. Hayden of Westminster decided to make section
22 "subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law"
remains a mystery.22' He was a proponent of the three-judge sys-
tem, 2 2 2 so surely he was not trying to dilute the power of an in banc
panel with a last-minute amendment. Yet it is hard to read his
amendment as doing anything but that. In fact, read broadly, his
amendment appears to grant the legislature, and perhaps the Court
of Appeals as well, the power to do what they choose to in banc
review, notwithstanding that the right issues from the constitution.
And the Court of Appeals has been wont to read the amendment
broadly.
The Court of Appeals' interpretations of Hayden's amendment
culminated in the great opinion of Montgomery County v. McNeece.2 25
The McNeece opinion is great not in the sense of what it does for the
law, but in what it reveals about the judicial process. The substance
of the opinion reflects a pitched battle among cerebral judges on a
relatively minor point of law, incorporating questions of history,
constitutional theory, and judicial philosophy, with a quasi-realist
majority carefully changing the law to meet the demands of modem
litigation, and a spirited, quasi-formalist dissent 224 insisting that
rules are rules. And the bulk of the opinion is pure dicta.
The facts, unfortunately, are not as great as the opinion.
McNeece was a Montgomery County firefighter who thought a sal-
ary increase should have accompanied his promotion. 22 5 He lost in
an administrative hearing and on administrative appeal, but the cir-
219. Id. at 408, 578 A.2d at 219; see MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-706 (1989).
220. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22 ("and this Section shall be subject to such provisions
as may hereafter be made by Law").
221. See supra text accompanying note 140-142.
222. See supra text accompanying note 131.
223. 311 Md. 194, 533 A.2d 671 (1987).
224. The "dissent" was technically a concurrence, but on the only important issue it
was clearly a dissent.
225. McNeece, 311 Md. at 195-96, 533 A.2d at 671.
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cuit court reversed and directed an increase in salary.226 The
County sought in banc review, and McNeece moved to dismiss be-
cause the County had "failed to reserve its points or questions... in
accordance with" section 22. The in banc panel agreed with
McNeece and dismissed, leaving the circuit court order standing.227
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals also dismissed, but this
time it did so because the County was the party who sought in banc
review and thus section 22 precluded further appeal by the County.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the section 22
ground that the County was not entitled to further review. 228
The Court of Appeals did not stop there, however. It noted
that the in banc panel had declared part of rule 2-551 unconstitu-
tional, and, as Judge McAuliffe wrote, "[a]lthough we ordinarily do
not express our views on any question raised by a dismissed appeal,
we occasionally do so to resolve a matter of substantial impor-
tance. '"229 The part of the Rule declared unconstitutional by the in
banc panel allows points or questions to be reserved by the ordinary
means of objection rather than by formal exceptions. 230 Although
section 22 itself does not say how points are to be reserved for in
banc review, 23 ' an 1886 case suggested that formal exceptions were
required,23 2 and the court subsequently assumed that they were. 2
3 3
That meant that after an objection was overruled, counsel had to ask
the judge to save an exception, whereupon the judge would " 'stop
the trial and call the scrivener who, with his quill pen, would make a
record on parchment.' ",234 The trial judge bound, signed, and cer-
tified these exceptions at the end of the trial and they became a Bill
of Exceptions for purposes of appeal or in banc review. 23 5
The Court of Appeals pointed out that formal exception prac-
226. Id. at 196, 533 A.2d at 671-72.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 197-200, 533 A.2d at 673-74.
229. Id. at 200, 533 A.2d at 674.
230. See MD. R. 2-551(a).
231. Interestingly, an early version of section 22 does suggest how points would be
reserved, and it appears that Alvey intended that the trial judge should take "full and
fair notes of such of the proceedings before him ... as will fully present such points or
questions... " PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 502.
232. See Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 124, 3 A. 285, 285 (1886).
233. See McNeece, 311 Md. at 215, 533 A.2d at 681 (Eldridge, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Costigin interpretation of § 22 had been consistently recognized and adhered to by the
General Assembly and this Court, until the unfortunate adoption of rule 2-551(a) in
1984.").
234. Id. at 202, 533 A.2d at 675 (quoting MILTON D. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE




tice had gone out of style in other Maryland court proceedings in
1945,2 s6 pursuant to a Court of Appeals rule of procedure,23 7 and
that in 1984 an amendment to rule 2-551 had finally eliminated the
requirement of exceptions for in banc review. 238 The problem was
that earlier case law had held that formal exceptions were constitu-
tionally required. 9
Judge McAuliffe invoked two constitutional provisions to sup-
port his finding that the amended rule 2-551 was constitutional:
Hayden's amendment allowing changes to section 22, and the provi-
sion that grants the Court of Appeals authority to adopt rules of
procedure.2 4' The majority's theory was that section 22 allows in
banc review to be changed by law, and the Court of Appeals has
constitutional authority to make procedural changes, which "shall
have the force of law."'2 4 ' Because the changes made to rule 2-551
were promulgated by the Court of Appeals and were merely proce-
dural in nature, they had the force of law and thereby effected a
valid change to the original requirements of section 22.242
Although the majority's logic appears almost syllogistic, there
are a number of problems with it and it is hard to believe that the
majority was unaware of them. Before looking at those problems, it
is worth pointing out that the majority probably wrote what it
thought was the only reasonable opinion it could have written if in
banc review was not to be rendered completely useless. As Judge
McAuliffe intimated, not many modern lawyers or judges know how
to make formal exceptions properly. It is hard to imagine a circuit
court judge having much patience for a lawyer who requested for-
mal exceptions after every ruling, not because he wished to preserve
the issue for appeal, but "because, your honor, I want to make sure I
leave open the possibility of in banc review." So it seems thatJudge
McAuliffe in McNeece did what good judges are sometimes required
to do: He ignored the problems and wrote the opinion.
Judge Eldridge and two other concurring judges, however,
could not avert their eyes. Preliminarily, Judge Eldridge took thor-
ough and cogent exception to the majority's tactic of reaching a
236. See id. at 204, 533 A.2d at 676.
237. See MD. R. 2-517 (modern contemporaneous objection rule).
238. See MD. R. 2-551(a) ("Issues are reserved for in banc review by making an objec-
tion in the manner set forth in Rules 2-517 and 2-520.").
239. See Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 124, 3 A. 285, 285 (1886).
240. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a).
241. Id.
242. McNeece, 311 Md. at 206-07, 533 A.2d at 677.
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constitutional issue after dismissing an appeal.243 More impor-
tantly, he pointed out that formal exception practice is not required
by the text of section 22.244 Section 22 merely requires that the "res-
ervation shall be entered of record, during the sitting, at which such
decision may be made.- 245 As Judge Eldridge wrote, "Since [sec-
tion] 22 relates to the time for an election between appellate courts,
and not the matter of appellate preservation, it is no more obsolete
today than it was in 1867. "246 Moreover, it was only an appellate
decision that held that the reservation had to be made on the same
day as the decision,2 4 7 and the Court of Appeals has authority to
overrule its own decision.248
Judge Eldridge also was displeased with the majority's insis-
tence that it had the power to alter section 22. He quite correctly
pointed out the fallacy of the majority's apparent procedural-sub-
stantive distinction-all of section 22 is procedural, so it is difficult
to see what part of the section the Court of Appeals cannot now
change under the majority's logic. 2 4 9 More importantly, he thought
that the majority had overstepped its authority even on the proce-
dural side:
As far as I am aware, this is the first time in the history
of American constitutional jurisprudence that any appellate
court has taken the position that an authorization for legis-
lative implementation of a constitutional provision includes
an authorization to contradict or amend the mandatory re-
quirements of the constitutional provision itself. I flatly
disagree with the majority's view that the judges of this
Court have been empowered to amend the Maryland
Constitution.25 °
While the concurrence perhaps overstated its case,2 5 ' it did
243. See id. at 209-13, 533 A.2d at 678-80 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
244. See id. at 213, 533 A.2d at 680 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
245. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (emphasis added).
246. McNeece, 311 Md. at 215, 533 A.2d at 681 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
247. See Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 124, 3 A. 285, 285 (1886).
248. McNeece, 311 Md. at 215, 533 A.2d at 681 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Judge El-
dridge, however, would not have chosen to overrule Costigin. See id.
249. Id. at 217, 533 A.2d at 682 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 209, 533 A.2d at 678 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
251. The concurrence's argument implies that the Court of Appeals has in some way
usurped the legislature's authority. But the change provision in section 22 is not limited
to legislative change; it merely says "such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law."
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals in some instances
can issue rules that have the force of law. See MD. CoNsT. art. IV, § 18(a). Additionally,
it is not clear that the change provision in section 22 is an "authorization for legislative
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make a powerful point. The procedural provisions at issue were
written into section 22 in mandatory language, yet the court de-
cided, without any need to do so, that a general clause making sec-
tion 22 subject to provisions of law empowered the court to alter the
specific, mandatory language of the section. 52 As a matter of statu-
tory construction, this logic seems suspect.
In any event, Judge Eldridge may have missed one argument.
Neither he nor Judge McAuliffe considered the history of section
18-the constitutional provision that gives the Court of Appeals
power to make procedural rules. Had they done so they would have
found some intriguing similarities between that section and section
22. For instance, both sections were amendments to original judici-
ary reports, introduced at the same convention, in the same week,
and by the same man-Richard H. Alvey.253 When Alvey intro-
duced section 18 four days after he introduced section 22, the one-
vs. three-judge debate was ongoing. Alvey's intent with regard to
section 18, unlike his intent for section 22, seems clear because he
included it in the provision itself: "to prevent delays, and promote
brevity in all records and proceedings brought into said Court, and
to abolish and avoid all unnecessary costs and expenses in the pros-
ecution of appeals therein. '"2 54 Alvey, it seems, was not very happy
with the time and expense of appeals to the Court of Appeals. If his
intent with regard to the two sections was so similar, it seems un-
likely that he would have intended to enable the Court of Appeals to
use section 18 to change the terms of section 22 concerning either
how or when points should be reserved.255
implementation," and not an authorization for something more, although it might be
construed that way. See McNeece, 311 Md. at 209, 533 A.2d at 678 (Eldridge, J., concur-
ring). Moreover, the United States Constitution provides an example, although not per-
fectly analogous here, of how the terms of a constitution may sometimes allow the
legislature to contradict an apparently mandatory constitutional requirement. Article III
vests the judicial power of the United States in "one supreme Court," U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1, and gives the Court only appellate jurisdiction in most cases, see id. § 2, but it
gives Congress the power to make exceptions to and regulations of that jurisdiction, see
id. There is, of course, a great debate on just how far Congress can go in restricting
Supreme Court jurisdiction, but Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868), makes it at least
arguable that Congress could go far enough to infringe on the vesting and appellate-
jurisdiction clauses. See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 378-82 (3d ed. 1988).
252. See McNeece, 311 Md. at 206, 533 A.2d at 677.
253. See Perlman, supra note 57, at 357-58. For the text of the amendment, see PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 461-62.
254. PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 462.
255. Of course, when Alvey introduced section 18, Hayden had not yet proposed his
amendment to section 22 that would allow changes to be made by law.
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In fact, there is a clearer reason why Alvey could not have in-
tended this. As originally adopted, section 18 only allowed the
Court of Appeals to regulate its own appellate procedure. It was
not until much later that section 18 was amended to allow the Court
of Appeals to regulate rules "in the other courts of this State. "256
Moreover, section 22 itself states that the local circuits "shall regu-
late, by rules, the mode and manner of presenting such points. '"257
Whether the amendment to section 18 gave the Court of Appeals
authority to alter the terms of section 22 is open to question, but it
is clear that Messrs. Hayden, Alvey, and Syester, and the other dele-
gates in 1867, never thought that the changes "as may hereafter be
made by Law" would issue from the Court of Appeals.
The practical significance of McNeece is that formal exceptions
are not required to reserve points for in banc review-at least for
now. Thus, those few lawyers who may be interested in in banc re-
view probably do not have to worry about two different procedures
for preserving objections. But they may have to worry about making
a trip to Annapolis to prove it. The McNeece issue arose again before
the Court of Appeals in a recent case,258 and although the court
never reached the issue, Judge Eldridge-this time in the majority-
noted that "[t]his Court's judgment in [McNeece] ... was not based
upon a resolution of the constitutional issue. "259
The broader significance of McNeece-if its reasoning is fol-
lowed in subsequent cases-is that the Court of Appeals apparently
now has authority to alter at least some of the provisions of section
22. The court suggested that this power was limited to procedural
alterations and it made clear that it had no intention of impairing
the "basic right" to in banc review. 260 Nevertheless, the concur-
rence suggested that the court may now have the power to do just
that. 26' Even a procedural change could have a fatal effect on the
right; for instance, if the court required full, appellate-style argu-
ments and briefs before the in banc court, there would be little use
256. See Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2763; see also Washabaugh v.
Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393,412 n.14, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037-38 n.14 (1979) (leaving open
the question of whether the Court of Appeals could by rule alter the number of judges
that constituted a court in banc); 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 498 (1978) (deciding that the Court
of Appeals' rulemaking power extends to all courts of the state).
257. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
258. See Dabrowski v. Dondalski, 320 Md. 392, 578 A.2d 211 (1990) (per curiam).
259. Id. at 395 n.l, 578 A.2d at 213 n.l.
260. See McNeece, 311 Md. at 206, 533 A.2d at 677.
261. See id. at 217, 533 A.2d at 682 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
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for in banc review. 62 Moreover, there is nothing in the court's logic
that would prevent the legislature from making "substantive" changes
to section 22, which presumably could include a de facto repeal of
the right.263 Of course, there is nothing inherently bad about either
the court or the legislature restricting the right; after all, other states
seem able to get by without in banc review.
F. In Banc Review in Baltimore City
The Court of Appeals' power to alter the terms of section 22
also affects one other curious (but dormant) constitutional issue re-
garding in banc practice. For many years the in banc rule by its
terms did not apply to Baltimore City.2 ' The rationale was that the
city's judiciary structure was completely different from that of the
other circuits, and the availability of review by the Supreme Bench
made in banc panels unnecessary in the city.2 65 Moreover, the judi-
ciary article of the Maryland Constitution is divided into clear sec-
tions, one of which addresses the county circuits and includes the in
banc provision, and another of which addresses only the city and
does not include the in banc provision. 66 Further, section 22 refers
to "the three Judges of the Circuit" as composing a court in banc,
and in 1867 Baltimore City was the only circuit that did not have
three judges.267
In the 1979 case of Washabaugh v. Washabaugh,26a several liti-
gants challenged this geographical application of the in banc rule as
a violation of federal equal protection. The Court of Appeals curi-
ously declined to decide whether in banc practice in Baltimore City
was valid under the Maryland Constitution, 269 but the court did de-
cide that even if it was not, the resulting unequal treatment across
262. This might raise an issue similar to the question of the scope of Congress's
power to regulate Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction via the exceptions and regula-
tions clause. See supra note 251.
263. Of course, the court never affirmatively suggested that the legislature may make
such changes; it simply did not consider the question. The point is that the "Law" that
the Court of Appeals is allowed to make is limited by section 18 to "rules and regula-
tions concerning the practice and procedure" in the courts of Maryland. The legislature
has no such restriction.
264. MD. R. 510d (1977) (current version at MD. R. 2-551).
265. See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. No. 94 (Supreme Bench Balti-
more City 1977) (in banc) (discussing why section 22 is not applicable to Baltimore
City), reprinted in THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Oct. 27, 1977, at 3.
266. See MD. CONST. art. IV.
267. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, reprinted in THE DAILY RECORD, supra note 265,
at 3.
268. 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979).
269. See id. at 403, 404 A.2d at 1033.
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jurisdictions would not violate federal equal protection. The court
found two rational bases for treating the city differently: "the desire
to avoid the additional encumbrance such appeals might impose
upon Baltimore City's heavily burdened judicial machinery, '2 70 and
"the complex nature of Baltimore City's court system. "271
The entire issue would best be forgotten except that shortly af-
ter Washabaugh was decided, the state constitution was amended to
give Baltimore City exactly the same judicial structure as the rest of
the state.272 Among other things, the city's new judicial structure
resurrected the question Washabaugh left open-whether the in banc
rule applies to Baltimore City-because the elimination of the
Supreme Bench arguably left some need for in banc review in the
city. The Maryland Rules Committee was aware of the issue but ap-
parently thought it would be better resolved by case law than by
rule. 273 But that seems unlikely. The Court of Appeals is going to
have trouble interpreting section 22 to apply to Baltimore City if it
uses any sort of originalist analysis, because it seems quite clear that
the delegates never intended that it would apply there. As a practi-
cal matter, however, it seems unlikely that the court would decide
that the Rule does not apply to the city: for one thing, in banc re-
views are occurring in Baltimore City,2 74 and for another, explicitly
making the Rule inapplicable might revive the equal protection ar-
gument, because one of the two rational bases cited in Washabaugh
disappeared with the reconstitution of the city's court system. In
the end, then, if the Court of Appeals finds a need to declare that in
banc practice applies to Baltimore City, it may be best for it to
amend rule 2-551 rather than to make a pronouncement from the
bench. Proceeding by rule would allow the court to rely on the
same logic the majority relied on in McNeece-section 22 contem-
plates its own amendment by law, and the Court of Appeals has con-
stitutional authority to promulgate court rules; therefore a Court of
Appeals rule that alters section 22 may be constitutional. Whether
this logic itself is constitutional is, of course, another question.
270. Id. at 409, 404 A.2d at 1036.
271. Id. at 410, 404 A.2d at 1036.
272. MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 27-39, repealed by Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 523, 1980 Md.
Laws 1869.
273. See MARYLAND RULES COMMiTrEE, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE RULES COM-
MrrrEE 9 (Nov. 20-21, 1981) (comments of Judge McAuliffe).




The misunderstanding of section 22 is due not only to the fram-
ers' failure to keep a journal of their proceedings, but also to the
scarcity of early appellate decisions interpreting the section. The
Court of Appeals' erroneous interpretations-if indeed they are er-
roneous-show that the interstitial method of constitutional devel-
opment creates problems when the interstices become too long. By
the time the Court of Appeals had occasion to interpret section 22
substantively, most of the framers were dead, and they left behind
little record of their intent. Hence it is hard to blame the Court of
Appeals for veering off course with respect to the purpose of section
22.
Interestingly, the question of the Court of Appeals' power to
change section 22 affects more than just the necessity of taking for-
mal exceptions in order to secure in banc review. In fact, it threat-
ens to render moot one of the premises of this Comment: that the
Court of Appeals has eviscerated useful in banc practice in part be-
cause it has ignored the original intent of section 22. After all, if the
court can change the terms of section 22 by using its rulemaking
authority, who cares about the original intent of that section?
On the other hand, that conclusion bolsters a second premise
of this Comment: that the Court of Appeals should give some teeth
to in banc practice by allowing in banc panels to perform certain
interlocutory reviews,2 75 or by disallowing certain interlocutory re-
views from in banc panels,276 or by expanding the in banc panel's
jurisdiction.277 If the Court of Appeals' rulemaking power allows it
to change the terms of section 22, then the same question applies:
Who cares whether these suggestions comport with the original in-
tent of section 22?
It would be ironic if the court were to invoke its rulemaking
authority and Hayden's amendment both to justify its own depar-
tures from the original intent of section 22, and also to undo some
of those changes in order to return in banc practice to something
both more practical and more attuned to the original wishes of
Messrs. Alvey, Syester, and Hayden. Unless it does, however, the in
banc rule will continue to be a reminder that in fact, on July 22,
275. See supra Subpart III.C.
276. See supra Subpart III.B.
277. See supra Subpart III.D.
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1867, there was no important action upon the provisions of the
Maryland judiciary.
JOHN J. CONNOLLY
